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HALLUCINATIONS OF NEUTRALITY IN THE OREGON
PEYOTE CASE
Harry F. Tepker, Jr.*
In The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law,' former Judge Robert H. Bork described the painful dilemma confronting judges who are asked to interpret the Constitution:
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of
choice, when a judge realizes that in the case before
him his strongly held view of justice, his political and
moral imperative, is not embodied ...

in any provi-

sion of the Constitution. He must then choose between
his version of justice2 and abiding by the American
form of government.

Judge Bork is primarily concerned with the judge who goes
beyond the Constitution to intrude on legislative power. He does
not speak of the judge who goes beyond the Constitution to
subtract from established doctrines of individual freedom. It is
this problem that is illustrated by the opinion of the Court in
Departmentof Human Services v. Smith (Smith 1I).3 The Court's

decision is a remarkable example of judicial willingness to distort
precedents to destroy traditional concepts of individual liberty.
Sadly, the case may only be a portent of things to come.
Smith II was a case initiated by two drug counselors who had
been fired because of their sacramental use of peyote. In a case
focusing on the constitutionality of Oregon's criminal laws as
applied to peyote use in the rituals of the Native American
Church, these members of the Church asked the United States
Supreme Court to hold that their religious practice was protected
by the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 4 The Court
© 1991 Harry F. Tepker, Jr.
*

Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. J.D., Duke University, 1976. B.A.,

Claremont Men's College (now Claremont McKenna College), 1973. The author wishes
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1. R. Boax, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: TmE POunCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW

(1990).
2.
3.
4.
hibiting

Id. at 1.
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prothe free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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refused. Five justices not only rejected the specific claim of the
two litigants, but also revised the doctrines of religious liberty.
Smith II holds that the free exercise clause is never implicated
when a superficially neutral law-that is, a law of general
applicability-interferes with a religious practice.
In section I, the facts of the peyote case are discussed. Section
II explores the implications of the Court's rule that a neutral,
.generally applicable law never violates the free exercise clause.
The purpose of section III is to show that the Oregon peyote
case is inconsistent with the precedents that the Court cites as
justification for its new doctrine. In section IV, the essay examines the alleged dangers of close judicial scrutiny in free
exercise cases. Section V concludes that the Court chose to
substitute one narrower conception of religious liberty in place
of the first amendment's traditional protection for religious
privacy.
L

Facts

The constitutionality of Oregon's ban against peyote use came
before the United States Supreme Court in an oblique manner.6
Oregon did not follow the example of other western states
which exempt religious use of peyote from criminal drug laws.
Oregon prohibited intentional possession of all "controlled
5. For discussions of the historical origins of the free exercise clause, see, e.g.,
T. CuRRY, THE FmsTr FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAOa OF
THE FIRsT AamNmEr (1986) [hereinafter FIRST FREEDoMs]; W. MI.R, THE FIRST
LiREwTY (1986); McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1410 (1990) [hereinafter Historical Understanding];
Adams & Emmerich, The Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559
(1989); Kurland, The Origis of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 Wm. &
MAivv L. REv. 839 (1986). For discussions of free exercise doctrine and the issue of
religious exemptions from laws of general applicability, see, e.g., McConnell & Posner,
An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 1 (1989);
Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion,
102 FlARv. L. REv. 933 (1988); Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986
B.Y.U. L. 1 Ev. 299; McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1,
1-3; Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CALIF. L. Rav. 753
(1984); Choper, The Religious Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. Prr. L. REv. 673, 676 (1980); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Non-Establishment

and Doctrinal Development, Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HAV. L.
REv. 1391 (1967). See also Note, Developments-Religion and the State, 100 HhAv. L.
Rsv. 1605 (1987); Note, Free Exercise: Religion Goes to "Pot," 56 CALI. L. 1Ev. 100
(1968).
6.Smith II, 110 S.Ct. at 1618 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Twenty-three]
states, including many that have significant Native American populations, have statutory
or judicially crafted exemptions in their drug laws for religious use of peyote.").
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substances"-as defined by federal law7-unless the substance
has been prescribed by a medical practitioner. One of these
controlled substances was peyote." Persons who violated the law
were guilty of a felony. 9 Oregon's criminal laws were the primary
justification for a private drug rehabilitation organization's decision to fire two members of the Native American Churchwho admitted using peyote in religious rituals-from their jobs
as drug counselors. 10 However, Oregon had only rarely attempted to enforce the law, so Oregon courts had not authoritatively decided whether its statutes banned ritual use of peyote
by the Native American Church. The two employees did not
challenge their dismissal, but sought unemployment benefits.
The Employment Division denied the counselors' application
for unemployment compensation on grounds that they were
ineligible because of work-related "misconduct."" However, the
discharged employees had more success before Oregon courts in
their effort to secure unemployment benefits. The Oregon Court
of Appeals held that the denial of benefits violated respondents'2
rights under the first amendment to free exercise of religion.
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.
The Oregon Supreme Court avoided the issue of whether
sacramental peyote use could be punished under Oregon's criminal law, by focusing on whether unemployment compensation
could be denied. 3 Citing several decisions of the United States
7. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1989). The state law incorporated federal defi-

nitions of "controlled substances." Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), as modified by the State
Board of Pharmacy. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.005(6) (1989).
8. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(a)(19) (1989) ("[Peyote] Meaning all parts of the plant

assembly classified botanically as Lophophorawilliamsii Lemaire, whether growing or
not, the seeds thereof, any extract from any part of such plant, and every compound,
manufacture, salts, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or
extracts.") (interprets 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), schedule l(c)(12)). See also OR. Ry. STAT. §
475.005(6) (1989); OR. ADww. R. 855-80-021(3)(s) (1988).
9. OR. R v. STAT. § 475.992(4)(a).14.

10. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 600 (1988) (Smith 1). The Court
remanded the decision to the Supreme Court of Oregon for clarification of the legality
of the use of peyote by members of the Native American Church.
11. See OR. ADMN. R. 471-30-038 (1988). Misconduct is a willful violation of the
standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employee and
is an act that amounts to a willful disregard of the employer's interests.
12. Black v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 707 P.2d 1274 (Or. App. 1985);

Smith v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 445 (1986).
13. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 209, 218-19,
721 P.2d 445, 449-50 (1986). See also Black v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources, 301 Or. 221, 224-25, 721 P.2d 451, 453 (1986).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991

4

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16

Supreme Court, 14 the Oregon court concluded that the state
violated the first amendment when it denied unemployment
benefits because of the employee's religious practices.' 5 In the
view of the Oregon court, the purpose of the rule that employees
could not obtain compensation after a discharge for "misconduct" was to preserve the financial integrity of the state's compensation fund. Disqualifications for "misconduct" were not
designed to enforce the State's criminal laws. In the court's
view, no compelling interest justified
the burden imposed on
16
respondents' religious practice.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 17 The Supreme
Court accepted a critical portion of the Oregon's Employment
Division's analysis: "If a State has prohibited through its criminal laws certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct without
violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that it may
impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation benefits to persons who engage in that conduct."' 8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decided that resolution of the first
amendment issue was premature, because Oregon had not authoritatively decided whether sacramental use of peyote was a
violation of state law.19 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded the case for
further proceedings.20
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon's2 1
law "makes no exception for the sacramental use" of peyote..
Therefore, the two counselors' use of peyote during Native
American Church ceremonies violated Oregon's criminal law.
However, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the prohibitions against sacramental peyote use were unconstitutional.
On this new theory, the court reaffirmed its previous decision
that 2 the fired employees were entitled to unemployment bene-

fits. z

For the second time, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.2 In Smith II, the Court considered "whether the Free
14. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
15. Smith, 301 Or. at 217-19, 721 P.2d at 449-50.
16. Id. at 218-19, 721 P.2d at 449-50.
17. 480 U.S. 916 (1987).

18. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988) (Smith 1).
19. Id. at 673.
20. Id. at 674.
21, 307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988).

22. Id. at 76, 763 P.2d at 150.
23. 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
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Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of
Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach
of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug."''
II.

Superficial Neutrality and the Free Exercise Clause

Justice Scalia's interpretation of the free exercise clause creates
the illusion of precision. Beginning with principles not at issue,
Justice Scalia defines rights of free exercise by emphasizing
freedom of belief and by disparaging freedom of practice:
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost,
the right to believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all "governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such." . . . The government may not
compel affirmation of religious belief, ... punish the

expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false,
... impose special disabilities on the basis of religious
views or religious status, .. or lend its power to one

or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma[.]2
The opinion concedes 'exercise of religion' often involves not
only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention
from) physical acts." Yet, religious practice is only protected
when government regulation is "specifically directed" 27 at religiously-inspired behavior.2
[The dismissed counselors] contend that their religious
motivation for using peyote places them beyond the
reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed
at their religious practice, but that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for
other reasons. They assert, in other words, that "pro24. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1599.

25. Id. at 1599 (citations omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Id. "Under the no-exemptions view, the free exercise clause exists solely to
prevent the government from singling out religious practice for peculiar disability. The
evil to be prevented is ... 'laws that directly and intentionally penalize religious
observance."' Historical Understanding, supra note 5, at 1418 (quoting Bork, The
Supreme Court and the Religion Clauses, in "TupmNGo THE REMUION CLAUSES ON THEIR
HE S": PROCEEDINoS OF THE NATIONAL REIGIous FREEDOM CONFERENCE OF THE
CATHOLIC LEAOuE FOR REuGIous AND CsV

RiGTs 83, 84 (1988)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991

6

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

hibiting the free exercise [of religion]" includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable
law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an
act that his religious belief forbids (or requires). As a

textual matter, we do not think the words must be
given that meaning. It is no more necessary to regard
the collection of a general tax, for example, as "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" by those citizens
who believe support of organized government to be
sinful, than it is to regard the same tax as "abridging
the freedom ... of the press" of those publishing
companies that must pay the tax.... It is a permissible reading of the text ... to say that if prohibiting

the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of
printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision[,]
the First Amendment has not
been offended. 29
Using the Court's new standards, the critical factor is the government's motivation for a particular law. The italicized language by Justice Scalia echoes language in Personnel
Administrators v. Feeney, a case challenging a veterans' preference policy as purposeful gender discrimination in violation
of the fourteenth amendment. Feeney held that if the state
adopted the challenged veterans' preference law "because of,
not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group," heightened judicial scrutiny was appropriate. Likewise,
under Smith II, the constitutionally-protected freedom for religious worship is threatened only if a government acts to disadvantage a religious practice "at least in part because of, rather
than in spite of" the impact on religion. In this way the doctrines
of religious liberty have been transformed to mirror the requirement of the equal protection clause that purposeful discrimination must be proved before
a court will demand persuasive
31
justification for a state law.
Justice Scalia's opinion notes that no Supreme Court case has
involved a governmental attempt "to ban ...

acts or abstentions

only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only
because of the religious belief that they display. '32 He added,
29.
30.
31.
32.

Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1599-1600 (emphasis added).
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1604 & n.4, 1606.
Id. at 1599.
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"It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban
the casting of 'statutes that are to be used for worship purposes,'
or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf. '33 After Smith
II, the free exercise clause prohibits little more.3 4 According to
the Court, the drug counselors sought "to carry the meaning of
'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' one large step further"
than immunity for religious
belief and protection against gov35
ernment discrimination.
Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when
otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the
conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so
now. There being no contention that Oregon's drug
law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs,
the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising
of one's children in those beliefs, the rule to which
we have adhered ever since [Reynolds v. United States]
plainly controls. "Our cases do not at their farthest
reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government." 3 6
One passage appearing late in Justice Scalia's opinion offers
an entirely new theory to justify a newer, narrower free exercise
jurisprudence. It can be read as a confession; it might be read
as a proclamation of a newer judicial attitude toward the Constitution's explicit guarantees of individual liberty. Justice Scalia
believes that "[v]alues . . . protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Flew States would be so naive as to

enact a law directly prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such.... If the
First Amendment is to have any vitality, it ought not be construed to cover only the

extreme and hypothetical situation in which a State directly targets a religious practice").
But see De Hasque v. Atchison, 68 Okla. 183, 173 P. 73 (1918) (Oklahoma prohibition
statute interpreted to exempt use of wine in Catholic Mass, despite failure of the
legislature not to create an exemption for sacremental use). See also Brown, Oklahoma's

"Bone Dry Law, " 52 CHaomNcLas op OKLA. 316 (1975) (describing national controversy
over Oklahoma Legislature's deliberate 1917 refusal to exempt use of sacramental wine

in Catholic Mass from prohibition statutes).
35. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
36. Id. (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971)) (emphasis

added).
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thereby banished from the political process. ' 37 He predicts that
"a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to
religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in
its legislation as well."38 Justice Scalia points out that many
States "have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use." ' 39 As a result, he denies that the courts have
a special duty to determine when such accommodation is constitutionally required, despite the foreseeable consequences of
judicial inaction.
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to
the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system
in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 4°
Though Justice Scalia defends the peyote decision as neutrality
and equality in form, he acknowledges that the new doctrine
will probably not be either neutrality or equality in substance.
In plain words, Justice Scalia admits some unpopular religions
without political influence will suffer because of the Smith II
decision. Indeed, the peyote issue illustrates this acute problem.
Many efforts to suppress peyote use began as laws "specifically
directed" against Native American religions. 41 Now, in the aftermath of Smith II, the same policies may be adopted again,
albefit the new laws must now be in superficially neutral form.
One problem with a purposeful discrimination standard is the
extreme difficulty of proving improper governmental motivations. Justice Scalia himself pointed this fact out in a dissenting
opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard,42 a case which concerned a
state statute requiring "balanced treatment" for the teaching of
"creationism." Indeed, Justice Scalia's analysis clarifies the foreseeable-and foreseen-impact of the peyote standards.
37. Id. at 1606.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. rd.
41. See, e.g., id. at 1622 n.10 ("Oregon's attitude toward ... religious peyote use
harkens back to the repressive federal policies pursued a century ago") (quoting Barsh,
The Illusion of Religious Freedom for Indigenous Americans, 65 Oa. L. REv. 363, 37071 (1986) ("In the government's view, traditional practices were not only morally
degrading, but unhealthy")); P. LumucK, THE LEoACY OF CoNQuEST 205 (1987).
42. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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[Although] it is possible to discern the objective "purpose" of a statute (i.e., the public good at which its
provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal
motivation of a statute where that is explicitly set
forth, [discerning] the subjective motivation of those
enacting a statute is, to be honest, almost always an
impossible task. The number of possible motivations,
to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite. In
the present case, for example, a particular legislator
need not have voted for the Act either because he
wanted to foster religion or to improve education. He
may have thought the bill would provide jobs for his
district, or may have wanted to make amends with a
faction of his party he had alienated on another vote,
or he may have been a close friend of the bill's
sponsor, or he may have hoped the Governor would
appreciate his vote and make a fund-raising appearance for him, or he may have been pressured to vote
for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or by
a flood of constituent mail, or he may have been
seeking favorable publicity, or he may have been reluctant to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff member
who worked on the bill, or he may have been settling
an old score with a legislator who opposed the bill,
or he may have been mad at his wife who opposed
the bill, or he may have been intoxicated and utterly
unmotivated when the vote was called, or he may have
accidentally voted "yes" instead of "no," or, of course,
he may have had (and very likely did have) a combination of43 some of the above and many other considerations.
This passage is one of the least stirring arguments for judicial
deference to political judgments to ever appear in the Supreme
Court reports. After digesting Justice Scalia's jaundiced-and
realistic-view of legislative process, it is difficult to understand
why he ever prefers to leave the fundamental value of religious
freedom to the vagaries of the politics. Yet, in Edwards, Justice
Scalia proceeds to conclude:
To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator
is probably to look for something that does not exist.
Putting that problem aside, however, where ought we
43. Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to look for the individual legislator's purpose? We
cannot... assume that every member present [agreed]
with the motivation expressed in a particular legislator's pre-enactment floor or committee statement."
Justice Scalia identifies other possible sources of evidence: staffprepared committee reports, post-enactment floor statements,
post-enactment testimony from legislators and media reports.
His tone becomes mildly sarcastic as he outlines a series of
rhetorical questions that reveal his hostility to a judicial search
for covert unconstitutional motives.
All these sources, of course, are eminently manipulable. Legislative histories can be contrived and sanitized, favorable media coverage orchestrated, and postenactment recollections conveniently distorted....
Having achieved, through these simple means, an assessment of what individual legislators intended, we
must still confront the question [how] many of them
must have the invalidating intent. If a state senate
approves a bill by vote of 26 to 25, and only one of
the 26 intended solely to advance religion, is the law
unconstituti6nal? What if 13 of the 26 had that intent?
What if 3 of 26 had the impermissible intent, but 3
of the 25 were simply attempting to "balance" the
votes of their impermissibly motivated colleagues? Or
is it possible that the intent of the bill's sponsor is
alone enough to invalidate it-on a theory, perhaps,
that even though everyone else's intent was pure, what
4
they produced was the fruit of a forbidden tree?
The difficulty of discovering legislative intent is a sound reason
for judicial reluctance to interpret a law in a way that departs
from the plain meaning of the statutory text." When applied to
the problem of discriminatory intent, however, the refusal to
look beyond the face of the statute becomes a formula for
judicial tolerance of concealed bias. The implication of Justice
Scalia's attack on legislative history as evidence of unconstitu44. Id. at 637 (emphasis in original).
45. Id. at 638 (emphasis in original).
46. Compare, e.g., Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 109 S. Ct.
2854 (1989) (Kennedy, J., for the Court) (legislative history of federal statute aids in
selection among plausible readings of text) with id. at 2872 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(review of legislative history is appropriate when "some ambiguity" in the text and

structure of a statute exists).
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tional motivation is that courts should make only a superficial
examination of a statute's text for its "formal" purpose. If a
statute is superficially neutral, then, as far as the Court ought
to be concerned, it is neutral, no matter what the subjective
intentions of the legislators might have been. If these two con-

cepts are fused-first, a judge-made requirement that a specific
and improper purpose be proved before judicial intervention,

and, second, a judicial refusal to look beyond the face of a law
for evidence of improper purpose-constitutional law is trans-

formed from a protection of individual liberty into a thinlydisguised judicial abdication of responsibility for remedying any

but the most obvious constitutional transgressions. 47 This would
be the natural, inevitable, logical-and probably the intendedconsequence, if the holding of the Oregon peyote case is reinforced by Justice Scalia's hostility to careful judicial scrutiny of
legislative motivation. 4

Ifi. Misuses of Precedent
In Justice Scalia's formulation, the dispositive issue in the
Oregon peyote case and most other cases involving free exercise
47. Justice Scalia's persistent emphasis on facial neutrality as a decisive factor in
constitutional and statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the Court's past decisions.
Compare, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (prohibitions of the
commerce clause are not confined to "the rare instance where a state artlessly discloses
an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods") and Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) ("Determining whether
invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available") and Hunter
v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., for a unanimous Court) (though
inquiries into legislative motivation "is often a problematic undertaking," legislative
history of state constitutional provision adopted in 1901 was persuasive to establish
discriminatory purpose in a case challenging continuing discriminatory effects of disenfranchisement tactic) with Lorance v. A.T.T. Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261
(1989) (Scalia, J.for the Court). Justice Scalia stated it is a mistake
to equate the application of a facially neutral but discriminatorily adopted
system with the application of a system that is facially discriminatory.
with a facially neutral system the discriminatory act occurs only at the
time of adoption, for each application is nondiscriminatory[.] But a facially
discriminatory system ...by definition discriminates each time it is applied. This is a material difference for purposes of analysis ... which

focuses on the timing of discriminatory acts for purposes of the statute
of limitations.
Id. See also, e.g., Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
48. Smith 11, 110 S.Ct. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring): "There is nothing
talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability ... for laws neutral toward
religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his
religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion.
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claims is whether the first amendment creates a constitutional
immunity for religion-inspired *violations of neutral "generally
applicable laws." '49 The opinion of the Court relies almost exclusively on precedent for its resolution of this issue. The Court
says it has "never held that an individual's religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." ' 0 Indeed, the
Court claims its jurisprudence consistently denies the proposition
that the first amendment provides any immunity for religiouslyinspired lawbreaking.
Justice Scalia's history of precedent is not trustworthy. 51 The
first case Justice Scalia cites after he makes the statement quoted
in the previous paragraph is Minersville School District Board
of Education v. Gobitis,52 in which the Court upheld Pennsylvania's power to compel all public school students-including
children raised as Jehovah's Witnesses-to salute the flag and
recite'the pledge of allegiance. Justice Scalia quotes Justice
Frankfurter's opinion for the Court:
[Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the
long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to'a general law not aimed
at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The
mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does
not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political
responsibilities. 53
Justice Scalia introduced this quotation by saying that it "succinctly described ... more than a century of our free exercise

jurisprudence." 54 To be sure, the Frankfurter quotation states
Justice Scalia's thesis perfectly. Also, the quotation is the essence
of the Gobitis rationale. Still, in passages not quoted by Justice
49. Id. at 1599.
50. Id. at 1600.

51. Justice O'Connor objected to Justice Scalia's majority opinion because it gave
a "strained reading of the First Amendment" and it "disregard[ed] our consistent
applicattion of free exercise doctrine to cases involving generally applicable regulations
that burden religious conduct." Id. at 1607. Justice Blackmun was less circumspect in
his condemnation of Justice Scalia's work. He joined in the portions of Justice O'Con-

nor's opinion that, Justice Blackmun wrote, "carefully detailed" Justice Scalia's "mischaracterizing" of precedent. Id. at 1616.
52. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
53. Id. at 594-95, quoted in Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
54. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
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Scalia, Justice Frankfurter also took care to note his view that
the case involved national security, "an interest inferior to none
in the hierarchy of legal values." 5 5 Justice Frankfurter disdained
absolutes; he cherished "the truth that no single principle can
answer all of life's complexities. ' -6 Even in Gobitis, Justice
Frankfurter stated that "every leeway should be given to the
claim of religious faith" because the interests protected by the
first amendment were "so subtle and so dear." 57 Gobitis can be
read narrowly as a case that requires careful and sensitive balancing of competing interests, rather than as a defense of all
neutral law. Justice Frankfurter's craftsmanship was cautious:
He argued for a strong presumption in favor of the validity for
general laws, but he did not declare that superficial neutrality
was always sufficient for a law's constitutionality. In short, a
full reading of Gobitis suggests that the Court made a narrow
point and deliberately refrained from crafting a broader rule. If
Justice Frankfurter had thought that religious liberty had utterly
no claim against the enforcement of a superficially neutral law,
much of his discussion of governmental interests in Gobitis was
utterly unnecessary.
In any event, Gobitis was emphatically overruled by the Supreme Court in the middle of World War II, a mere three years
after it was announced.5 8 Justice Scaia does not mention he is
relying on a discarded and discredited decision. His omission
would not be satisfactory in a first year legal research and
writing course. Dictates of candor should have compelled Justice
Scalia to account for the singular fact that the Court turned
away from Gobitis. 9 Surely, as a matter of elementary logic,
the burden of proof is on one who claims that an explicitly
overruled decision represents a principle that has prevailed
throughout American constitutional history. Yet, the repudiated
doctrine of Gobitis is the analytical beginning point for Smith
II, an opinion that overturns almost the entirety of the Court's
past work, even as it claims to be a decision justified by precedent.
55. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595.
56. Id. at 593-94.
57. Id. at 594.
58. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
59. Later in the Smith II opinion, Justice Scalia lists Barnette in a string citation
among the cases which "involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections." Smith II, 110 S.
Ct. at 1601.
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Justice Scalia offers analysis of two categories of cases for
his bold misinterpretation of precedent: Cases in which free
exercise claims failed, and cases in which free exercise claims
prevailed. A close look at this body of precedent demonstrates
that the Supreme Court never categorically excluded superficially
neutral laws from judicial review based upon the free exercise
clause. In short, precedent does not command-or justify-the
new analysis articulated in Justice Scalia's opinion of the Court.
Justice Scalia pointed to six basic cases to support his view
that the Supreme Court has "consistently held that the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his :religion prescribes (or proscribes).'60 All are cases in which
the Court rejected free exercise claims. However, Justice Scalia
ignores the fact that all are also cases in which the Court openly
and carefully weighed governmental interests against alleged
inteirference with religious practices. He distills from these cases
an absolute rule that was never stated in any of them: Neutral
laws never implicate or violate the free exercise clause.
First, Justice Scalia discussed the 1879 decision in Reynolds
v. United States,6' in which the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of a practicing Mormon for violating federal criminal
laws forbidding polygamy. The analysis of the Court in Reynolds
does not follow the pattern of'most civil liberties cases in recent
years. The Court does not "balance" competing interests in so
many words. As a result, Reynolds appears to be the strongest
authority for Justice Scalia's analysis. Still, a careful reading of
the entire case demonstrates that the Reynolds Court did not
even begin to articulate an absolute rule that placed all laws of
general applicability beyond the scope of the first amendment.
The majority began its analysis of the free exercise issue by
examining the prevailing understanding of religious liberty at
the time the first amendment was ratified. First, the Court
described the movement to protect religious freedom before
69. Id. at 1600 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment)). See id. at 1600-01. Justice Scalia focuses on Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Later in his opinion, after
discussing the six basic cases, Justice Scalia cites additional cases in which he says the
court rejected free exercise claims to support the narrower conception of religious liberty.
Smith II,110 S. Ct. at 1602-03.
61. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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adoption of the Constitution. 62 The Court's primary focus was
Virginia's enactment of Thomas Jefferson's proposed statute for

religious freedom. 63 The Court quoted the preamble to the law:
"[I]t is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government

for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt
acts against peace and good order."" The Court states that the

fight for Virginia's statute influenced James Madison's draft of
the first amendment. Finally, the Court concluded its brief look
at the historical evidence by quoting Thomas Jefferson's famous
reply to the Danbury Baptist Association, in which he argued
that: "[L]egislative powers ... reach actions only, and not

opinions."

6

The Court accepted Jefferson's view "as an au-

thoritative declaration of the scope" of religious liberty,
"[c]oming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the
advocates" of the first amendment." On the basis of this evi-

dence, the Court held that "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach

actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order."

67

Next, the Reynolds Court examined the traditions of monogamy in most civilized nations. This portion of the Court's

opinion is devoted to the theme that regulation of marriage and
le'al prohibition of polygamy is of central importance to western
culture.
In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to
believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious

freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect
to this most important feature of social life. Marriage,
... a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in most civi62. Id. at 166-67.
63. Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 12 HEMMG'S STAT. 84 (1785).
64. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163 (quoting Virginia's Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom, 12 HEmNo's STAT. 84 (1785)).
65. Id. at 164 (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge and
Others, a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in
T. JEa]ERSON, WrT=GS (M. Petersen, ed. 1984)).
66. Id. According to Professor McConneli, the Reynolds Court had an accurate
understanding of Jefferson's position, but Jefferson's views of free exercise protections
were not representative of the views of those who advocated the first amendment.
Historical Understanding, supra note 5, at 1451. Indeed, "Jefferson's advocacy of a
belief-action distinction placed him at least a century behind the argument for full
freedom of religious exercise in America.... [While Jefferson was one of the most
advanced advocates of disestablishment, his position on free exercise was extraordinarily
restrictive for his day." Id. at 1451-52.
67. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
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lized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated
by law. 6

It is difficult to be sure where the Reynolds Court placed its
emphasis in the opinion. In the Oregon peyote case, Justice
Scalia quoted Reynolds, apparently to show that Reynolds' concept of "overt acts" is critical:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief
and opinions, they may with practices.... Can a man
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his
religious belief? To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen
69
to become a law unto himself.
The quoted passage substantiates the view that religion is not
always an excuse for lawbreaking. However, in context, the
passage does not say that the free exercise clause is never a
basis for an immunity for religiously-inspired conduct. The entirety of the Reynolds opinion embraces an argument that governmental regulation of marriage is of such compelling importance
that religious inspiration cannot be an excuse for polygamy.
Thus, the convicted Mormon lost because his practices were
"overt acts against peace and good order.''70
To put the matter in a different way, Reynolds, relying heavily
on the words of Jefferson, does distinguish between beliefs and
actions. However, while Jefferson sought to disable the government from any power over opinions, the Court in Reynolds did
not infer that the first amendment allowed government to reach
and. regulate all actions. The Reynolds Court was content to
hold that polygamy, a practice that violated the fundamental
morality of this society, could be punished, because such a
holding was all that was necessary to decide the case. Logically,
there would have been no need to discuss the importance of
marriage, if government could punish all overt acts. 7' Justice
68. Id. at 165.
69. Id. at 166-67, quoted in Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1600 (1990).
'70. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163. "Upon [marriage] society may be said to be built,
and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties." Id. at
165.
"71. Historical Understanding,supra note 5, at 1462 ("Mhe free exercise right was
not understood to be confined to beliefs. Beliefs without more do not have the capacity
to disturb the public peace and safety .... If the basic right [of free exercise] did not
extend to 'overt acts,' the provisos would be unnecessary"); id. at 1459 (state constitutional provisions adopted between 1776 and the ratification of the first amendment
were not confined to beliefs, opinions and expression).
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Scalia distorts and exaggerates Reynolds by claiming that the
case distinguishes between absolute protection of religious belief
and absolute tolerance for governmental regulation of overt
behavior. Even if Reynolds had been the final word of the
Court, the case does not establish the comprehensive rule that
is announced in the Oregon peyote case.
Justice Scalia's next case is Prince v. Massachusetts,72 in which
the Court upheld the application of state child labor laws to a
mother who had used her children to dispense religious literature
in the streets. Prince involves the explicit constitutional right of
religious liberty and the nontextual rights of parenthood. As a
result, it should have been categorized as a "hybrid" case under
Justice Scalia's analysis of prior free exercise cases. 3 Rightly or
wrongly, the Court accepted Massachusetts' arguments that the
child labor laws are the only reasonable means for the state to
use to fulfill its duty to its children. The Court balanced competing interests, and decided that the government's objective to
protect children against exploitation was paramount. Prince is
not authority for the idea that all laws of general applicability
comply with the free exercise clause.
In Braunfeld v. Brown, 4 the Court upheld Sunday-closing
laws against the claim that they disadvantaged persons whose
religions compelled them to refrain from work on other days.
This is the third case cited by the Court as precedent for its
narrowed interpretation of the free exercise clause. Again, however, the Court did not suggest that the first amendment was
irrelevant merely because the state law was neutral in form.
Chief Justice Earl Warren, speaking for a plurality of the Court,
focused on the fact that no person was required to abandon
their religious beliefs in order to comply. 75 Those who practiced
their religion on Saturday suffered an economic disadvantage
because they lost one additional day in their business week. The
Sunday closing laws did not force a person to surrender one
fundamental right-the right to worship God according to the
dictates of their religion-in order to enjoy government benefits,
legal privileges or other rights. 76 The law "impose[d] only an
72. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

73. See infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.
74. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).

75. Id.at 605.
76. Id. at 605-06. Braunfeld suggests another way to restrict the impact of the free
exercise clause. Close scrutiny would be appropriate only in cases in which government
interferes with religious practices that amount to "worship." Id.at 605. Prior to
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indirect burden on the exercise of religion" and did not "make
unlawful the religious practice itself.""
Braunfeld does not state or imply an absolute rule that states
may regulate religious practices, if the regulations are neutral
and generally applicable. A state, the Court indicated, can regulate or restrict religious activities if those activities are violations
of "important social duties, or subversive of good order, even
when the actions are demanded by one's religion. 78 The plurality opinion emphasized the continuing import of the free
exercise clause in terms that cannot be reconciled with Justice
Scalia's analysis of precedent:
[To hold unassailable all legislation regulating conduct
which imposes solely an indirect burden on the observance of religion would be a gross oversimplification.
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the
observance of one or all religions or to discriminate
invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect ....
[if] the State may
accomplish its 79
purpose by means which do not impose
such a burden.
The plurality concluded that the State had no other way to
achieve the legitimate goal of mandating a day of rest for all
80
citizens.
Justice Frankfurter wrote a single separate opinion addressed
to both the Braunfeld and McGowan cases. His careful history
of the traditions of religious liberty deserve special attention,
because his work as the author of Gobitis was so prominent in
Justice Scalia's attempt to summarize free exercise jurisprudence.
As always, Justice Frankfurter refrained from absolute pron-

ratification of the first amendment, eight states-New York, New Hampshire, Delaware,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina-and
the federal Northwest Ordinance of 1787 confined protection to "worship." Historical
Understanding, supra note 5, at 1460. "The word 'worship' usually signifies the rituals
or ceremonial acts of religion, such as the administration of the sacraments or the

singing of hymns, and thus would indicate a more restrictive scope for the free exercise
provisions" than suggested by the language adopted in the first amendment. Id. at
1460-61.
17. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.

18. Id. at 603.
79. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
S0. Id. at 607-08 (discussing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450-52 (1961)).
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ouncements. He began his analysis with the observation that
"[i]nnumerable civil regulations enforce conduct which harmonizes with religious canons." 8 This fact was no basis for suspicion. Indeed, he continued, such laws do not "always support
equally the beliefs of all religious sects." Again, this inevitability does not present a substantial first amendment problem:
"Because these laws serve ends which are within the appropriate
scope of secular state interest, they may be enforced against
those whose religious beliefs do not proscribe, and even sanction,
the activity which the law condemns. ' 8 However, in dramatic
and significant contrast to the absolutism of Smith II, Justice
Frankfurter expressly denied "that government regulations which
find support in their appropriateness to the achievement of
secular, civil ends are invariably valid under the First or Fourteenth Amendment[s], whatever their effects in the sphere of
religion. "84

Frankfurter embraced the basic tradition of careful judicial
scrutiny of laws interfering with religion, although he would
require the religious claimant to show that the loss of freedom
outweighed governmental interests. In this respect, Justice
Frankfurter favored reversal of presumptions when a burden on
religious liberty is proved. Even so, Justice Frankfurter advocated balancing:
If the value to society of achieving the object of a
particular regulation is demonstrably outweighed by
the impediment to which the regulation subjects those
the
whose religious practices are curtailed . . . or 'if

object sought by the regulation could with equal effect
be achieved by alternative means which do not subpractices, the regulastantially impede those religious
85
sustained.
be
tion cannot
Justice Frankfurter carefully assessed the reasons why a legislature "might choose not to make an exception" to Sunday
closing laws, though his language and analysis were plainly more
deferential to legislative judgments than strict scrutiny.86 After
concluding that "the legislative choice of a blanket Sunday ban
applicable to observers of all faiths cannot be held unreasona81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

McGowan, 366 U.S. at 462.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514-20.
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ble," Justice Frankfurter then proceeded to a new inquiry: He
carefully assessed "whether the importance to the public of
those ends is sufficient to outweigh the restraint upon the religious exercise ... which the restriction entails. "87 Thus, Justice
Frankfurter's approach bears little similarity to Justice Scalia's
defense of an absolute immunity for all neutral laws. The author
of Gobitis adhered to a presumption in favor of validity of state
law, but he weighed the gains and pains of state statutes in light
of the constitutional values secured by the free exercise clause,
albeit with a respect for governments' rights to formulate rules
for communities. The author of Smith II denies the courts should
have any role whatever to review laws of superficial neutrality.
A national security case was the next precedent cited by the
Court for its holding in the Oregon peyote case. In Gillette v.
United States,88 the Court refused to mandate exemptions from
the nation's military selective service system for those who opposed a particular war on religious grounds. In Gillette, of
course, the government's security interests were paramount. 9
The Court avoided the problem of religious pacifism-that is,
religiously-inspired objection to all war-and held only that the
free exercise clause does not require the national government to
accommodate those persons who object-for whatever reasonto a particular war.9 The essence of the Court's view was that
it would be unreasonably burdensome on government to administer the law under any other interpretation. 91 Finally, in Gillette,
the Court reaffirmed the traditional judicial approach: Even
when considering neutral laws or regulations, first amendment
rights will prevail if the demonstrated interference with religious
freedom is not justified by overriding governmental aims.92
Finally, the last of Justice Scalia's six basic cases rejecting
free exercise claims was United States v. Lee.3 The Court
rejected the theory of an Amish employer, who had sought
exemption from the social security system because the Amish
faith prohibited participation in governmental support programs.9 4 The neutrality of the social security system was consid87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
'93.
94.

Id. at 520.
401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971).
Id. at 461.
Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 463.
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
Id. at 260.
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ered by the Court as a basis for its decision, but neutrality was
not the end of the analysis, as in the peyote case. Instead, the
Court employed its traditional analysis.95 First, the Lee majority
sought to determine whether the federal law burdened or interfered with religious practices.9 Second, it considered whether
the burden on religion was necessary to achieve overriding governnental interests.9 Finally, it examined whether accommodation of the religious practice would unduly interfere with
achievement of the governmental interest.9 8 The Court held that
religious interest could and should be accommodated if state
action required persons to choose between the state and their
religion-but some beliefs must yield to the common good. As
might be expected, the Court determined that a comprehensive
social security system was an important governmental interest
which outweighed the burden on the Amish."
There would be no way.., to distinguish the Amish
believer's objection to Social Security taxes from the
religious objections that others might have to the collection or use of other taxes. If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain
percentage of the federal budget can be identified as
devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would
have a similarly valid claim to be exempted from
paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax
system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments
were spent in a manner that violates their religious
belief.10o
The common theme of these cases-the cases selected by
Justice Scalia because claims of religious freedom were rejected-is that a balancing test of some nature is necessary.
These six cases reinforce the long tradition supporting careful
and sensitive judicial weighing of competing interests even when
laws are challenged as violations of the free exercise clause.'0 '
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

258-61.
256-67.
257-58.
259.

99. Id. at 260.
100. Id.
101. For lack of a more precise and more consistent terminology, this essay will
refer to all of the various tests employed in free exercise cases as "close scrutiny." In

Smith II, the Court referred to the Sherbert test as "strict scrutiny." Close scrutiny
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Nevertheless, in Smith II, the Court discarded the traditional
standards. 02
in the majority opinion in Smith II, Justice Scalia claims that
the traditional standards-articulated in such cases as Sherbert
v. Verner'0 3-never really applied to other free exercise cases.
He bases this conclusion on the fact that even if the Court paid
lip service to a balancing test, the Court always found the test
satisfied, except for the unemployment benefits cases directly
controlled by SherbertY°4 In other words, close scrutiny was not
the real test;105 the actual attitude of past Justices was deferential
toward neutral legislation and hostile toward demands for ex,emption. There is, of course, an implication that past Courts
have been dishonest in their opinions. The majority's unspoken-but unmistakable-attack on the candor of predecessor
courts suggests that traditional doctrine has been a lie. Justice
Scalia's colleagues could not have missed the point. In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor responded:
That we rejected the free exercise claims in those cases
hardly calls into question the applicability of First
Amendment doctrine in the first place. Indeed, it is
surely unusual to judge the vitality of a constitutional
doctrine by looking to the win-loss record of the
plaintiffs who happen to come before us.e 6
To be sure, the principle announced in Smith II could not
have been unexpected. Between 1972 and 1990, the Supreme
requires that government justify its refusal to grant exemptions to a neutral law with
evidence of overriding government objectives. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 529-30 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (summarizing the tests). See infra
notes 135-39 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the various types
of close scrutiny.
102. In dissent, Justice Blackmun recalled the "painstaking" development of "a
comistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that
burdens the free exercise of religion." Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1615. See also, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 110 S. Ct. 16 (1989) (compelling interest test); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (compelling interest

test).; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
diss.nting in part) (compelling interest test); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
58 (1982) ("overriding governmental interest"); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (compelling interest); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
215 (1972) ("interests of the highest order"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
(1963) (compelling state interest).
1.03. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
104. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
105. Id. at 1602-03.
106. Id. at 1610 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Court "rejected every claim for a free exercise exemption to
come before it, outside the narrow context of unemployment
benefits governed strictly by Sherbert."1°7 Nevertheless, none of
these decisions announced the absolute immunity for laws of
general applicability manufactured in Smith IL Thus, the one
distinct characteristic of Justice Scalia's argument is its claim
that the absolute immunity derives from past decisions of the
Court. By contrast, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Thomas v.
Review Board of Indiana Employment Security,10 was more
candid when he offered a conclusion that foreshadowed the
holding of Smith I. Justice Rehnquist believed that when "a
State has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of
which is to advance the State's secular goals, the Free Exercise
Clause does not ... require the State to conform that statute
to the dictates of religious conscience of any group." 109 However,
Justice Rehnquist defended this approach as a necessary change
in doctrine because the Court's jurisprudence was "muddied,"' 10
and because the Court had read "the Free Exercise Clause too
broadly and ... fail[ed] to acknowledge that such a reading
conflicts with many of our Establishment Clause cases." '
Likewise, Justice Stevens had also announced his views prior
to Smith II. In United States v. Lee,12 Justice Stevens concluded
that the Court's holding left "virtually no room for a 'constitutionally required exemption' on religious grounds from a valid
13
... law that is entirely neutral in its general application.'
Though Justice Stevens analyzed many of the cases discussed
by Justice Scalia in a similar way, his summary of precedent
acknowledged that efforts in Lee to distinguish the Court's prior
107. Historical Understanding, supra note 5, at 1417. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (a prison's refusal to change the work schedule of
Muslim prisoners to accommodate Friday worship services does not violate the free
exercise clause); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (the free exercise clause
was not violated when the military prohibited an Orthodox Jewish officer from wearing
a yarmaluke while on duty and in uniform); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary
of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (federal minimum wage laws apply to religious foundation); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (IRS may deny tax exempt
status to a university that prohibits interracial dating and marriage because of the
university's sincere religious convictions); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
(Amish must contribute to Social Security funds, despite sincere religious beliefs).
108. 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981).
109. Id. at 723.
110. Id. at 720.
111. Id. at 727.
112. 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (concurring).
113. Id.
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cases, including Wisconsin v. Yoder,1 4 were "unconvincing."" '

Yoder and other cases in which neutral laws have been dedared unconstitutional are a threat to the Court's newly-minted
construction of the free exercise clause. Fully aware of the
inconsistency between these cases and his absolutist thesis, Justice
Scalia practices a form of denial. These cases were not really
free exercise cases at all, he claims. They were really "hybrids,"
in which two or more fundamental constitutional rights trumped
asserted governmental interests." 6 In his words, "[t]he only
decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action ... involved not the Free Exercise Clause

alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
press .... ,,1
Turning to the peyote case, Justice Scalia's opinion holds that
Smith II "does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free
exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or
parental right.""' This conclusion is offered without analysis.
There is no consideration of the possibility that the sacramental
ceremonies-including the ritual ingestion of peyote-might also
be protected by rights of association or rights of religious expression.
Even apart from the possibility that the peyote case could
be categorized as a "hybrid" case as persuasively as Cant-

well v. Connecticut,"9 West Virginia Board of Education v.

1:14.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
115. Id. at 263 n.3.
116. Smith II, 110 S.Ct. at 1601.
117. Id. at 1602.
118. Id.
119. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Cantwell was decided primarily on the basis of principles
that are distinctively rooted in the first amendment's protections of free speech. The
fact that the speaker's words were religious in character is almost an irrelevancy. He
could have been expressing almost any other type of provocative point of view, and
the Court's analysis would have been similar.
However, Cantwell still does not support Justice Scalia's idea that two constitutional
interests-free speech and free exercise of religion-trigger heightened scrutiny. One
interest or the other would have been sufficient. Governmental infringement of either
freedom needs justification. And so the Court carefully explained, "[n]o one would
have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions
incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to
physical attack upon those belong to another sect." The Cantwell facts demonstrate an
overlap of free speech and free exercise interests; the rationale assumes that a similar
judicial test will be applied to protect either interest when placed in jeopardy by
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Barnette,2 0° or Yoder, the fundamental problem with the majority's analysis is that each of these cases did articulate the test
to be applied when litigants allege that superficially neutral laws
interfered with religious liberty. These cases hold that a neutral

law's undue burden on religious practices threaten fundamental
constitutional rights,' 2 ' and that such burdens must be persua-

sively justified by government as necessary to achieve governmental objectives "of the highest order."'

Wisconsin v. Yoder is the clearest case. Yoder, a member of
the Old Order Amish, was fined because he refused to send his
children, age fourteen and age fifteen, to public schools as
required by the state's compulsory education law. The United
States Supreme Court held that the application of this law

burdened the religiously-inspired practices of Yoder. Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the Court is important for several reasons.
First, in free exercise cases, the Yoder court held that "belief
and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments."'' Thus, Yoder is one case that demonstrates that the
Court did not endorse the deceptively and dangerously simple

analysis of Reynolds and Gobitis-as interpreted by Justice

governmental action. The case does not establish some sort of categorical distinction
between speech and conduct, between belief and action or between religious expression
cases and religious practice cases. For an argument that some free exercise issues are
better treated as expression cases, see Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma:
Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MirN. L. Rnv. 545 (1983).
120. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Barnette did rely on principles of expressive liberty to
overrule Gobitis' interpretation of religious liberty. Nevertheless, the fact that the Court
felt that it was necessary to overrule Gobitisdemonstrates that Barnette speaks to issues
of free exercise of religion as well as to compelled speech. Moreover, in Barnette, Justice
Jackson cited historic cases of superficially neutral laws that coerced affirmations of
respect to secular, but governmental authority. The historic examples were, Justice
Jackson noted, "well known to the framers of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 633 n.13.
Early Christians were frequently persecuted for their refusal to participate
in ceremonies before the statue of the emperor or other symbol of imperial
authority. The story of William Tell's sentence to shoot an apple off his
The
son's head for refusal to salute a bailiff's hat is an ancient one ....
Quakers, William Penn included, suffered punishment rather than uncover
their heads in deference to any civil authority.
Id.
121. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638; Yoder, 406 U.S. at
214.
122. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230-31. See also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311; Barnette, 319
U.S. at 639.
123. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
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Scaia. 124 Moreover, Chief Justice Burger's opinion denied that
the neutrality of Wisconsin's compulsory education law was
decisive: Such regulations "may offend the constitutional requirement for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the
free exercise of religion."'' 2
[O]ur decisions have rejected the idea that religiously
grounded conduct is always outside the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that activities of
individuals, even when religiously based, are often
subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of
their undoubted power to promote the health, safety,
and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the
exercise of its delegated powers. But to agree that
religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to
the broad police power of the State is not to deny
that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus
beyond the power of the State to control, even under
regulations of general applicability .... 126
The Court did not rely on additional constitutional interestsparental rights, for example-as special justification for close
scrutiny. The Supreme Court conceded that the state's interests
in public education were important. Still, in Yoder, the Court
held that a more focused assessment of the state's interest
showed that an exemption for the Amish was appropriate, if
1 27
the principle of religious liberty was to be secured.
124. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (five Justices state that the federal
government could not compel conscientious religious objectors to provide such social
security numbers for their children); Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1608 ("Because the First
Amendment does not distinguish between religious belief and religious conduct, conduct
motivated by sincere religious belief, like the belief itself, must therefore be at least
presumptively protected by the Free Exercise Clause").
125. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20.
126. Id. (citations omitted).

127. Despite Justice Scalia's deceptive account of a century of free exercise jurisprudence, lower federal courts decided cases based on Sherbert-Yoder principles. See,
e.g., Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (conviction of Athabascan Indian for
shooting a moose out of season was reversed, because the hunt and kill was an essential
part of a religious funeral celebration, "the most important institution in Athabascan
life"); Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984) (Nebraska statute requiring

a photograph on a driver's license was unconstitutional as applied to a conscientious
religious objector to graven images); Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1984)
(the federal requirement that welfare applicants obtain Social Security numbers was
unconstitutional as applied to a fundamentalist Christian who believed that such numbers
were part of the Antichrist's plan to control mankind for Satan).
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The Balance of Anarchy, Politics, and Prejudice

After Smith II, government need not provide any explanation

for a refusal to grant exemptions. 12 Any "conceivable" rationale

will be strong enough to withstand a claim premised on interference with religious liberty.

29

In essence, except for laws spe-

cifically directed to religious practices, Smith II demotes
previously protected free exercise rights from the categorical

status of "fundamental rights" to the lesser level of "liberty

interests." 30
As Justice Scalia observed, the text of the free exercise clause

is ambiguous: It neither compels nor forbids a judicial interpretation that mandates exemptions from generally applicable laws. 3 '
To justify its revised view that exemptions are not mandatedever-by the clause, the Court attacked the compelling interest

test of Sherbert. First, judicial hostility to a government's refusal
to grant exemptions-embodied in a close scrutiny test-would

lead to a constitutionalized "anarchy" in which the individual
"by virtue of his beliefs, [would] '.

.

. become a law unto

himself.""' ' 3 2 Second, close judicial scrutiny requires balancing

of competing interests. This balancing undermines religious lib-

erty by forcing'court's to evaluate the "centrality" of a religious

practice to a specified religious doctrine. 133 The inevitable con-

discrimination against nontraditional
sequence would be judicial
34
and unpopular religions.
128. Historical Understanding,supra note 5, at 1419:
Both the exemption and no-exemption views... insist on neutral, 'secular'
laws and governmental practices, but the no-exemption view makes that
judgment exclusively according to the perspective of the government, while
the exemption view takes the perspective of the religious claimant, as well
as the countervailing interests of the government, into account.
129. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1617-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
points out that in previous cases challenging neutral laws which burdened free exercise,
the state was required to produce specific evidence to support its refusal to allow a
religious exception. None was demanded of Oregon in Smith II, and, as noted by Justice
Blackmun, none existed.
130. Cf. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling precedents
that treated liberty of contract as fundamental, the Court held that the individual right
to make contracts was only one component of all liberty interests to be secured from
"arbitrary restraint").
131. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1599. For a discussion of historical evidence respecting
the original understanding of the free exercise principle, see infra notes 216-34 and
accompanying text.
132. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1600 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
166-67 (1879)).
133. Id. at 1604-06.
134. Id. at 1604-05.
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A. The Road Not Taken: Close Scrutiny of Oregon's Refusal
to Exempt Sacramental Peyote Use from Drug Laws
It was necessary for the Court to denounce a compelling
interest test, and other forms of close judicial scrutiny. 3 ' The
only alternative to discarding the Sherbert test would be to find
that Oregon's law was justified by overriding interests."1 6 In this
case, at a minimum, such a test would require Oregon to prove
that the danger of peyote was real and substantial, not speculative. 137 Moreover, before Smith II, judicial doctrine required
a sensitive case-by-case assessment of facts and circumstances' 38

135. Close judicial scrutiny usually requires that government prove that a policy is
either necessary or closely tailored to state interests "of the highest order." Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972). However, the Court has varied itsdescription
of the principle that government must justify a refusal to grant exemptions from the
duties to obey a neutral law to sincere religious objectors. At a minimum, however, the
Couit has asked that government articulate and show that overriding government
objectives are at stake. See, e.g, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 529-30 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (summarizing the tests). The traditional formulation of "strict
scrutiny" has usually been used in free exercise cases. A statute may "stand only if the
law in general, and the State's refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are
justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means." Smith
II, 110 S. Ct. at 1615 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. When focusing on the value or worth of the government's objectives, the Court
is deciding whether the government's purposes are of sufficient importance to "outweigh" the value of religious liberty (or whatever other fundamental right is at risk),
This is the balancing component of the close scrutiny test. See also, e.g., Clark,
Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HAv. L. REv. 327, 330-31 (1969), quoted
in Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
The purpose of almost any law can be traced back to one or another of
the fundamental concerns of government: public health and safety, public
peace and order, defense, revenue. To measure an individual interest
directly against one of these rarified values inevitably makes the individual
interest appear the less significant.
137. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (government may not
"rely on mere speculation about potential harms," but must present "evidentiary support
for a. refusal to allow a religious exception.") See also, e.g., Thomas v. Review Board
of Indiana Employment Security, 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (the state failed to justify
its refusal to allow a religious exemption when it failed to present "evidence in the
record"); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224-29 (rejecting the state's justifications as speculative
and unsupported by evidence in the record); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407
(1963) ("there is no proof whatever to warrant such fears ... as those which the [State]
now advance[s]").
138. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]ur role as judges
[is] to decide each case on its individual merits .... [T]he First Amendment ... requires
a case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular
claim.").
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to assess the need to refuse exemptions. 13 9 If the Court had
followed its own pronouncements in free exercise cases decided
prior to Smith II, it would have carefully examined the governmental interests that were at stake in the peyote case.
At the outset of the Smith litigation, Oregon courts had not
authoritatively decided whether their law prohibited sacramental
peyote use. '4 Oregon had not prosecuted the two drug counselors, and the state had never undertaken "significant enforcement
efforts" against members of the Native American Church for
peyote use. 141 It is difficult to conclude that Oregon's laws were
necessary or even useful to achieve interests of importance, when
Oregon itself was uncertain whether its laws prohibited the use
of peyote in religious ceremony.
Justice Blackmun's dissent is the only opinion in Smith II to
examine the particulars of sacramental peyote use by the Native
American Church. Justice Scalia's opinion ignores all aspects of
the practice, because the new deferential test requires no governmental justification of superficially neutral laws. Justice
O'Connor's opinion defends close scrutiny in the abstract, but
finds that the state's general interests in drug prohibitions to be
sufficient.
Justice Blackmun attacks the common prejudice, which assumes that a nontraditional church's claim for a religious exemption is a pretext for evading drug laws. "Not only does the
Church's doctrine forbid nonreligious use of peyote; it also
generally advocates self-reliance, familial responsibility, and ab139. After concluding-or assuming-that the interest is sufficiently worthy, the
courts carefully examine whether the specific policy and the refusal to grant exemptions

are effective, essential or overbroad. If not, if there are effective alternatives, or if the
impact of the law is not "narrowly tailored," a close scrutiny test will invalidate the
deficient policy. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1608-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

In dissent, Justice Blackmun urged "it is important to articulate in precise terms the
state interest involved. It is not the State's broad interest in fighting the critical 'war
on drugs' that must be weighed against respondents' claim, but the State's narrow
interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious, ceremonial use of peyote.
See also, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 728 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (government must show that "unbending application of its
regulation.. . 'is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest') (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S., at 257-58); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (In free exercise
cases, courts "must searchingly examine [government] interests... and the impediment
to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed ... exception").
140. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1598; Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 67374 (1988) (Smith 1).

141. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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stinence from alcohol.' ' 142 Justice Blackmun concluded that peyote use could not be compared to the more familiar and
frightening drug abuse in American society: "Far from promoting the lawless and irresponsible use of drugs, Native America:n Church members' spiritual code exemplifies values that
Oregon's drug laws are presumably intended to foster.

' 143

Rates

of drug use and alcoholism among Indian members of the Native
American Church had dropped.'" If fighting drug abuse is the
"compelling," "important," or "overriding" objective, the
practices of the Church, including sacramental peyote use, produced the desired results.
A second prejudice rests on the assumption that "a drug is a

drug." More precisely, a general prohibition rests on fear that
one hallucinogenic drug is no different than any other dangerous
drug. Justice Blackmun noted Oregon offered no evidence that
the religious use of peyote was harmful. 45 Unlike other unlawful
drugs, "[tihe use of peyote is, to some degree, self-limiting. The
peyote plant is extremely bitter, and eating it is an unpleasant
experience, which would tend to discourage casual or recreational use."' 4 Justice Blackmun also pointed out that "[tihere
142. Id. at 1619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Olsen v. Drug Enforcement
Adnin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (the Native American Church "for all
purposes other than the special, stylized ceremony, reinforced the state's prohibition");
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 721-22 n.3, 394 P.2d 813, 818 n.3, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69, 74 n.3 (1964) ("[M]ost anthropological authorities hold Peyotism to be a positive,
rather than negative, force in the lives of its adherents.... IT]he church forbids the
use of alcohol").
143. "The carefully circumscribed ritual context in which respondents used peyote
is far removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of unlawful
drugs. The Native American Church's internal restrictions on, and supervision of, its
members' use of peyote substantially obviate the State's health and safety concerns."
Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1618 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id. at 1618-19; Olsen,
878 F.2d at 1464, 1467 (citing findings of the Drug Enforcement Administration that
"use of peyote [by church members] outside the ritual is sacrilegious" and that "the
Native American Church's use of peyote is isolated to specific ceremonial occasions");
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 721, 394 P.2d at 817 ("to use peyote for nonreligious purposes
is sacrilegious").
144. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1619-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1618 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Oregon's inability to demonstrate
the harm of peyote use or the need to refuse a sacramental peyote exemption was "not
surprising, [because] the State never asserted this health and safety interest before the
Oregon courts").
146. Id. at 1619 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also State v. Whittingham, 19
Ariz. App. 27, 30, 504 P.2d 950, 953 (1973) ("peyote can cause vomiting by reason of
its bitter taste"); E. ANDm soN, PEvor: Tan Drvian CAcTus 161 (1980) ("IElating of
peyote usually is a difficult ordeal.... Repeated use is likely ...

only if one is a

serious researcher or is devoutly involved in taking peyote as part of a religious
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practically no illegal traffic in peyote."' 147 In summary,

"peyote simply is not a popular drug; its distribution for use

in religious rituals has nothing to do with the vast and violent

traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this country." Apparently,
for all of these reasons, twenty-three states and the federal
government exempt sacramental peyote use from drug prohibi-

tions. 148 In light of the choices made by other states, who
presumably would feel just as compelled to fight drug abuse, it
is difficult to conclude that a total, absolute, and unyielding
ban of sacramental peyote use has overriding importance.
A persistent worry is that one religious exemption will lead
to more. "Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral march;
grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be
confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from
religious deviants of every stripe."' 149 Justice Scalia exploits this
fear by listing the kinds of governmental practices that might

be imperiled if courts granted too many free exercise exemptions. 150 Justice Blackmun responded sensibly that exemptions
for sacramental peyote use are as old as the attempts to suppress
the supposedly "heathenish" practice. The exemptions that have
been granted did not lead to other religious exemptions for
other, more dangerous drug practices. In light of these facts,
"[t]he State's apprehension of a flood of other religious claims

is purely speculative.' 5' There is little doubt that in many other
ceremony"); Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in TEAcmNos FROM a AmmzucAN FArrH at 98
(D. Tedlock & B. Tedlock eds. 1975) ("[Mlany find [peyote] bitter, inducing indigestion
or nausea").

147. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1620. See also Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1463, 1467 (DEA
reports that total amount of peyote seized between 1980 and 1987 was 19.4 pounds;
the total amount of marijuana seized during the same period was over 15 million
pounds).
148. Smith II, 110 S.-Ct. at 1618 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also 21 C.F.R.
§ 1307.31 (1989) ("The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does
not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native
American Church, and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are
exempt from registration."); Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1463-64 (explaining DEA's rationale
for the exception). See also Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. at 30, 504 P.2d at 953 ("[Ihe
State failed to prove that the quantities of peyote used in the sacraments of the Native
American Church are sufficiently harmful to the health and welfare of the participants
so as to permit a legitimate intrusion under the State's police power"); Woody, 61 Cal.
2d at 722-23, 725, 394 P.2d at 818, 820 (California was unable to justify ban against
sacramental peyote use when "as the Attorney General ... admits, the opinion of
scientists and other experts is 'that peyote ... works no permanent deleterious injury
to the Indian').
149. Lupu, supra note 5, at 947.
150. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1605-06.
151. Id. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun points out, courts
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circumstances, typical government strategies to eradicate the
plagpe of drugs could easily override the claims of religious
sects. A decision in favor of sacramental peyote use could have
been distinguished from use of heroin, cocaine, and the other
mo:re prevalent dangers to the fabric of society, as easily and
as sensibly as sacramental use of wine could have been exempted
during prohibition.5 2
AL related suspicion is that aspiring lawbreakers will use religion as a pretext for criminal conduct. However, proof of sincere
relignous objection is an essential element for any successful free
exercise claim. 1 3 "[Jiudging credibility is a staple of the adjucommitted to the principle that governmental interference with free exercise requires
close and careful scrutiny have not had difficulty in drug cases. Many religious sects
have raised free exercise claims regarding drug use. Justice Blackmun reports that no
repotted case, except those involving claims of religious peyote use, resulted in a victory
for the religiously-inspired claimant. See, e.g., Olsen v. Iowa, 808 F.2d 652 (8th Cir.
1986) (marijuana use by Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church); United States v. Rush, 738
F.2d 497 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985) (same); United States v.
Middleton, 690 F.2d 820 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (same);
Unitcd States v. Hudson, 431 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1011
(1971) (marijuana and heroin use by Moslems); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851
(5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (marijuana use by Hindu);
Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 404 Mass. 575, 536 N.E.2d 592 (1989) (marijuana use
by Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church); State v. Blake, 695 P.2d 336 (Ha. App. 1985)
(marijuana use in practice of Hindu Tantrism); Whyte v. United States, 471 A.2d 1018
(D. C. App. 1984) (marijuana use by Rastafarian); State v. Rocheleau, 142 Vt. 61, 451
A.2d 1144 (1982) (marijuana use by Tantric Buddhist); State v. Brashear, 92 N.M. 622,
593 P.2d 63 (1979) (marijuana use by nondenominational Christian); State v. Randall,
540 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. App. 1976) (marijuana, LSD, and hashish use by Aquarian
Brotherhood Church). See Annotation, Free Exercise of Religion as Defense to Prosecution for Narcotic or Psychedelic Drug Offense, 35 A.L.R. 3D 939 (1971 & Supp.
1989).
152. Pepper, supra note 5, at 327-28 (" [O]ne can attempt to distinguish between
situations [like Lee] in which 'strategic behavior' is likely to occur and those [like Yoder]
in which it is less likely").
153. On this point, Oregon never disputed neither the sincerity of the Native American Church nor the drug counselors who initiated the Smith litigation. The Church
believes that "the peyote plant embodies their deity, and eating it is an act of worship
and communion. Without peyote, they could not enact the essential ritual of their
religion." Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for
Association on American Indian Affairs, et al., at Amici Curiae 5-6). The Brief states,
in relevant part:
To the members, peyote is consecrated with powers to heal body, mind
and spirit. It is a teacher; it teaches the way to spiritual life through living
in harmony and balance with the forces of the Creation. The rituals are
an integral part of the life process. They embody a form of worship in
which the sacrament Peyote is the means for communicating with the
Great Spirit.
Brief at Amici Curiae 5-6.
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dicatory and administrative processes, and there is no reason
why the burden of proof on [the sincerity] issue ought not to
be on the claimant." '15 4 Also, there is no reason why the threshold requirement of sincerity will not suffice to avoid most of
the hypothetical horrors listed by Justice Scalia. 55
Congress erected still another major obstacle to Oregon's
claim of special need to refuse exemptions. The American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) provides:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right
of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions ... , including but not limited to
access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects,
and the freedom1 6to worship through ceremonials and
traditional rites.
Because Justice Scalia addresses the problems of close scrutiny
in all free exercise cases, the majority avoids the specific facts
and circumstances of Smith II, as well as the significance of the
AIRFA. The majority does not consider the fact that prosecution
necessarily forces Native Americans "to migrate to some other
and more tolerant region.' ' 57 "This potentially devastating impact must be viewed in light of the federal policy-reached in
reaction to many years of religious persecution and intoleranceof protecting the religious freedom of Native Americans.'1 5 At
a minimum, the federal legislation suggests that judicial scrutiny
59
should be sensitive to the Native American religions and cultures
and that Oregon's interest should be discounted. For all these
reasons, if judicial scrutiny had been truly close, it is highly
unlikely that Oregon could have proved that a refusal to exempt
sacramental peyote use served paramount interests.
154. Pepper, supra note 5, at 327-28.
155. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring): "The Court's parade
of horribles ... not only fails as a reason for discarding the compelling interest test,
it instead demonstrates just the opposite; that courts have been quite capable of applying
our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing state interests."
156. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982).
157. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
158. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. See, e.g., Note, The First Amendment and the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act: An Approach to Protecting the Native American Religion, 71 IowA L.
Ray. 869 (1986) (the Yoder test must be integrated with the policies of the AIRFA).
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B. Close Scrutiny and the Rule of Law
Nothing in Justice Scalia's opinion suggests that Oregon's law
might have passed a close scrutiny test. As a result, the majority
opinion cannot be viewed solely as an ad hoc sacrifice of Native
Americans' religious liberty to the war on drugs. The doctrine
of the case is broader, and more dangerous. In the opinion of
the Court, any test that demands evidence of justification from
government is a menace. Indeed, argues Justice Scalia, at stake
in the peyote case is the primacy of law over individual conscience: "To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs,
except where the State's interest is "compelling"-permitting
him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself,"
... contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense.''I60 In a sense, Justice Scalia's opinion is an essay on the
symbolic value of superficially neutral law. The Court knows
better than to cite symbolism as a meaningful governmental
interest, if a more particularized assessment fails to show a
justification. "[A] government interest in 'symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful
drugs,'... cannot suffice to abrogate the constitutional rights
16
of individuals." '
Of course, in Justice Scalia's view, more than symbolism is
at stake. Justice Scalia fears that generous protection of religious
liberty will subordinate law to the will of some individuals. He
knows that logic and consistency require that a close scrutiny
test must be "applied across the board, to all actions thought
to be religiously commanded" if the test is to resemble the
rigorous scrutiny required in race discrimination or free speech
cases. Justice Scalia fears consistency and rigor. His predictions
border on the apocalyptic. "Any society adopting such a system
would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct
proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its
determination to coerce or suppress none of them." America is
in greater danger, Justice Scalia argues, "precisely because 'we
are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
conceivable religious preference.' . . . and precisely because we
value and protect . . . religious divergence[.]' 62
160. Smith II, 110 S.Ct. at 1603 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
167 (1879)).
161. Id. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1401 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
162. Id. at 1605 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
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America's traditions of liberty, tolerance, and diversity may
seem to prove why a generous free exercise protection is appropriate. In Justice Scalia's logic, these traditions have the opposite
effect. A diverse republic, Justice Scalia holds, "cannot afford
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not
protect an interest of the highest order.' 63 Justice Scalia concludes his predictions of anarchy by listing the policies that
might be challenged, if the free exercise principle is guarded
with a close scrutiny test:
The rule respondents favor would open the prospect
of constitutionally required religious exemptions from
civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind ranging from compulsory military service, ... to the
payment of taxes, ... to health and safety regulation
such as manslaughter and child neglect laws,.. compulsory vaccination laws, .. . drug laws, ...
and
traffic laws, ... to social welfare legislation such as
minimum wage laws,.., child labor laws,... animal
cruelty laws, . . . environmental protection laws, ...
and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the
races.... The First Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not require this. 164
Of course, many of these laws have been challenged, but not
successfully.165 It is not necessary to distort the Court's precedents to see that the capacity of government has never been
threatened. To advocate a measure of freedom for religious
practice-a qualified immunity-is not to advocate anarchy.
Contrary to the shrill rhetoric of Justice Scalia, the Constitution's qualified immunities for religious practice have not threatened the social fabric or the integrity of law enforcement. Truly
important state policies have been far less vulnerable than the
essential practices of unpopular religious sects.'6 Justice Scalia's
rationale for discarding the close scrutiny test, except in the
unemployment benefits cases, relies on the cases in which judges
were sympathetic to governmental interests and skeptical of the
claims asserted in the name of religious freedom. The Court's
claim that close judicial scrutiny is a menace to the rule of law
163. Id.at 1605.
164. Id.at 1605-06.
165. Id. at 1602-03.
166. See supra notes 51-106 and accompanying text.
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sits uneasily with the claim that it has rarely been employed to
strike down neutral laws.
Justice Scalia also objects to close scrutiny in free exercise
cases because it is not an appropriate standard to review government's refusal to grant exemptiong. Close scrutiny produces
equality of treatment in race and gender cases, and an unrestricted flow of expression in press, speech, assembly, or petition
cases. These benefits, Justice Scalia argues, are "constitutional
norms." However, when close scrutiny is used in free exercise
cases, the test produces "a private right to ignore generally
applicable laws" which Justice Scalia denounces as a "constitutional anomaly."' 167 Iih response, Justice O'Connor appreciates
the differences among constitutional fundamental rights. Logically, equal treatment may be the norm produced by enforcement
of one constitutional provision, while an exception that respects
a constitutionally-sanctioned privacy is the result of another
provision's enforcement. 16
However, Justice Scalia's point may offer a clue as to why
his list of defeated free exercise claims does not really impeach
the Court's past doctrine. To be sure, strict scrutiny has never
been "strict in theory, fatal in fact," in free exercise cases. The
governmental interests accepted as "compelling" in free exercise
cases seem less important than almost all of the interests that
have been rejected as justifications for race discrimination or
censorship. And yet, the cases in which the Supreme Court
rejected free exercise claims involved important governmental
interests: national defense, taxation, education, regulation of
marriage and family, protection against exploitation of children.
Perhaps one reason similar interests have never been accepted
as justifications when racial equality or expressive liberty were
at stalce has little to do with the "worth" of the interests; it is
just not logically possible to figure out how excluding a black
person or punishing an unpopular idea is truly "necessary" for
promoting the identified value, except by embracing the false
ideologies of racism and thought control. Disparity is more
difficult to justify as effective, essential, and narrowly tailored,
while consistent enforcement is always well-directed toward
avoidance of a real danger, whether it is failure to pay taxes, a
plague of drug use, or some other practice that might spread
like a fad, with the possibility of a pretextual religious immunity.
In a. literal sense, an exemption is always possible; a refusal to
167. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1604.
168. Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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exempt is never necessary. In the more constructive and practical
sense of constitutional "necessity," equal enforcement of the
law is self-justifying, if the governmental objective is important
enough.
C. Equality of Right and the
Uncertainties of Judicial Balancing
The most fundamental concept of neutrality requires that a
healthy, generous liberty exist for all, or it will surely exist for
no one. 169 This concept links the constitutional themes of equality
and liberty. Referring to the declarations of rights in state
constitutions and the proposed bill of rights before the House,
Madison commented the declarations do "no more than state
the perfect equality of mankind." 17 0 One strategy is to define
principles of liberty with sufficient breadth and generality so
that the unpopular, the dissident, and the disfavored enjoy the
freedom that the majority can guarantee for itself. In this
respect, Smith II is an echo of another case, which also illustrates
Justice Scalia's uses-or misuses-of the past. In a footnote in
a plurality opinion in Michael H. v. GeraldD.,'7 Justice Scalia
claimed that, when defining the scope and significance of a
fundamental constitutional right, the Court must "refer to the
most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." 17 2
Distrustful of a constitutional methodology that allows judges
to defend expansively defined traditions, Justice Scalia argued:
Because [general] traditions provide such imprecise
guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than
discern the society's views. [Although] having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving judges free to decide as
they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a rule
of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular,
identifiable tradition, is no rule of law. 73
169. See, e.g., Address by Abraham Lincoln at Edwardsville, Ill. (Sept. 11, 1858),

reprintedin A. LiNcoLN: SPEcHns AND WRn=Gs 1832-1858, at 585 (D. Fehrenbacher
ed. 1989).

170. Address by James Madison in the U.S. House of Representatives (June 8,
1789), reprinted in THE MmD OF TRE FoUNDER: SoURcEs oF TEE PoimcA THOUGHT
OF JAmS MADISON at 210, 220 (M. Meyers ed. 1973) [hereinafter MIN OF THE FOUNDER].
See also FIRST FREEDOmS, supra note 5, at 199.
171. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).

172. Id. at 2344-45 n.6.
173. Id. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in a special concurring opinion to

reject the observations of Justice Scalia's footnote 6 in Michael H. Id. at 2346-47.
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Of course, in this case, Justice Scalia's method of examining a
form of "specific" tradition-the traditions embodied in precedent-left Justice Scalia free to dictate a new vision of religious
liberty, restricted not by the particular facts of the case, nor by
the text of the Constitution, nor by original understanding, nor
by previously announced jurisprudence. In reply to Justice Scalia's "specific tradition" test, Justice Brennan described the decidedly unneutral effect of allowing justices to define
constitutional principle based on "society's views" of how rights
of privacy are exercised.1 74 Justice Brennan argued that the use
of tradition as a guide to constitutional interpretation requires
that the tradition be defined broadly enough to encompass a
respect for diversity and a tolerance for the unusual:
We are not an assimilative, homogenous society, but
a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be
willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even
repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse
protects our own idiosyncracies ....
In a community
such as ours, "liberty" must include the freedom not
to conform. The plurality today squashes this freedom
by requiring specific approval from history
before
17
protecting anything in the name of liberty. 1
The peyote case misconstrues the problem of equality by
distorting the concept of neutrality to rationalize the bias of
majorities in free exercise cases. In some past cases, the free
exercise clause
has functioned primarily to protect what must be
counted as discrete and insular minorities, such as the
Amish, Seventh Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses. Whatever the original conception of the free
exercise clause, its function during essentially all of its
effective life has been one akin to the Equal Protection

Clause. 176
And yet, because the doctrine was not tied to purposeful discrimination, the clause operated differently. At its best, the

174. Id. at 2349-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2351.
176. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DimusT 100 (1980).
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clause prevented government from imposing undue burdens on
religious practices or beliefs "whether the burden is imposed
directly... or indirectly through laws that... make abandonment of one's own religion ...

the price of an equal place in

the civil community. 17 7 This experience shows that only a broad
and general definition of the free exercise clause serves true
equality. After Smith I, expressive liberty and intellectual liberty
are still protected, but cultural and religious diversity have been
relegated to the tender mercies of a political process that is not
trained or committed to respect the values, the beliefs or even
the humanity of unpopular minorities.
To be sure,' as Justice Scalia argues, judicial balancing can
also threaten religious liberty. In Smith HI, the Court rejects the
idea that close scrutiny is appropriate "only when the conduct
prohibited is 'central' to the individual's religion." The danger
is that the court's balancing will involve judgments about the
rationality and worthiness of religious doctrine. Doubtless, "it
is no more appropriate for judges to determine the 'centrality'
of religious beliefs before applying a 'compelling interest' test
in the Free Exercise field, than it would be for them to determine
the 'importance' of ideas before applying
the 'compelling inter' 178
est' test in the free speech field.
The majority discounts the possibility that a threshold requirement before use of a balancing test need not ask whether a
particular practice is "central" to a particular faith. Justice
Scalia is correct to point out that such inquiries into the "centrality" of a practice could often carry risks of theological
censorship. Of course, it must quickly be added that a judicial
abdication runs such risks also-and Justice Scalia admits1 that
79
less favored religious practices are likely to be the victims.
The centrality of a particular religious doctrine need not be
the focus for a balancing analysis. Instead, the key is determining
whether the degree of governmental interference rises to the level
of a "prohibition" of a religiously-inspired practice. Alterna177. Smith I1, 110 S. Ct. at 1610 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 1604. On this issue, the majority's remarks in Smith I are an interesting
endorsement of expressive liberty doctrines that are inconsistent with the Court's recent
experiments to "value" speech prior to deciding whether government regulation violates

the first amendment. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)
("[T]here is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material ... on
the borderline between pornography and artistic expression"); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (content of "vulgar," "offensive,"

and "shocking" speech "is not

entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances").
179. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
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tively, the issue is whether a law imposes an "undue burden"
on the exercise of religion.'80 As Justice O'Connor has pointed
out in other contexts, this inquiry is a familiar one in a wide
variety of cases.' 8' If a religious practice has not been stoppedor banned-it is reasonable to say that the constitutional value
of religious liberty has not been implicated. For example, sabbitarians are not prevented or stopped from honoring their day
of rest on Saturday, when a law closes business on Sunday.
True, they suffer an economic disadvantage. However, this consequence is not even a penalty, if the closing law is not devised
to inconvenience those with a different day of rest. Likewise,
fundamentalist Christians can and do object to some compulsory
education strategies that expose their children to various ideas
and concepts which they believe to be sinful and dangerous.
Without doubting the painful nature of such a conflict, it is

appropriate to recognize that a free society cannot guarantee
that people will not be exposed to ideas they might find offensive. Indeed, government must often guarantee that such exposure wili occur, if it is to remain faithful both to the dictates
of the first amendment and to the central mission of educating
the young.
Justice Scalia's attack on a judicial test that is tied to the
centrality or importance of religious doctrine echoes the familiar
objections to balancing as a method of defining constitutional
right. Judicial balancing often allows "utmost latitude for eva180. Compare id. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A neutral criminal law
prohibiting conduct that a State may legitimately regulate is, if anything, more burdensome than neutral civil statute placing legitimate conditions on the award of a state
benefit") with Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by
Powell and Rehnquist, J.J.) (without proof of religiously discriminatory intent, "the
Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for
governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of
promoting a legitimate public interest."). See also, e.g., McConnell & Posner, supra
note 5, at I (an economic definition of governmental neutrality respecting religion
demonstrates that the denial of unemployment compensation is not an undue burden
on religious practice).
181. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3063 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("a regulation imposed on a lawful abortion is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion"); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-67 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (undue burden on abortion choice must be established before
heightened scrutiny is appropriate); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same). See also University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S.Ct. 577 (1990) (academic freedom is not violated by
enforcement of federal law, when a university is unable to show direct burden, substantial
burden, or interference with content of academic expression).
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sion," and thus lacks the quality of a rule of law. 1 2 It often
fails to protect liberty, when protection is most needed.,,' In
free exercise cases, the test is often too responsive to preconceptions-prejudices-about the religious doctrine at stake. 184
For example, Yoder has been criticized because its description
of the Amish order and its role in American society reflects
cultural bias. For example, in Yoder, the Justices displayed an
obvious respect-even an affinity-for the quaint, nostalgic part
of America's past exemplified by the Amish tradition. Yoder is
one of a few successful recent free exercise lawsuits that make
doctrine look like a series of political compromises animated by
subjective judgments of the claimant's religion."8 5 The fact that
a focused and sensitive analysis was missing when similar free
exercise claims were rejected is troubling evidence that federal
courts give some religions and cultures one type of treatment,
while other sects and denominations are "preferred." The history of these decisions look more like "prosecutorial discretion"
6
than articulation of neutral constitutional principles.'
Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protection Association' 7 was
both an example of judicial insensitivity and a portent of judicial
abdication. In Lyng, the Supreme Court did not give close
scrutiny to a governmental decision to construct logging roads
over Indian burial grounds. The case can be distinguished. The
Court pointed out that the challenged action by the government
did not prohibit worship and it did not coerce individuals into
abandoning their religious beliefs. The building of the roads
also did not deny any person the benefits, rights and privileges
182. Compare, e.g., THE FEDERALiST No. 84, at 580 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.
1961) ("Who can give ['liberty of the press'] any definition which would not leave the
utmost latitude for evasion?") with J.ELY, DIEOcRAcY "D DRausT 231 n.14 (1980)

("In any First Amendment situation, for that matter in any situation involving our
liberties, it is desirable for courts to try to develop predictable and discretion-reining
rules").
183. Compare, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Black, J.,

for the Court) ("Pressing public necessity" may justify "legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group") with Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L.
Rnv. 865, 878-79 (1960) ("The great danger of the judiciary balancing process is that
in times of emergency or stress, it gives Government the power to do what it thinks
necessary.... And laws adopted in times of dire need are often very hasty and
oppressive laws").
184. See, e.g., Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CAiw. L. REv. 817 (1984).
185. Id. at 841-42.
186. Id.
187. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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enjoyed by other citizens by penalizing their religious activities.
The Court characterized the building of roads through Indian
burial grounds, which caused the destruction of those sacred
places, as an "incidental interference with an individual's spiritual activities.' 88 Because the Court determined that the building of the roads did not coerce individuals into abandoning their
beliefs, government had not "prohibited" the free exercise of
religion and no compelling governmental interest was necessary. 189 Lyng does not logically require the result in the Oregon
peyote case.
Nevertheless, the harsh and insensitive spirit of the two decisions are of one piece. Lyng is only one in a long line of cases
in which there has been a different standard applied by the
Court when considering practices and beliefs of the Native
American Church. 190 The Court's careful and respectful assessment of the Amish tradition in Yoder has not inspired a sensitivity to the claims of the Native American Church. 191 Justice
Scalia understands the problem, and uses it as a way of attacking
the close scrutiny test: "[I]t is hard to see any reason in principle
or practicality why the government should have to tailor its
health and safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious
belief, but should not have to tailor its management of public
lands ...

or its administration of welfare programs.' "'

Of course, the court's opinion in the peyote case not only
tolerates past judicial bias; it actually rationalizes the right of
the political process to enforce criminal sanctions even if such
laws will fall more heavily on disfavored religious sects, provided
only that the laws are defined in superficially neutral terms. The
peyote case leaves the means to enact well-camouflaged, but
prejudicial laws in the hands of state legislatures. This, Justice
1138.Id. at 450.
1139. Lupu, supra note 5, at 933.

190. See, e.g., Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedom for IndigenousAmericans,
65 OR. L. REv. 363 (1986).

191. In contrast to the Supreme Court's approach in Yoder, which evaluates the
intenelationship between Amish culture and religion, federal courts continue to treat
Native American culture and Native American religion separately in free exercise cases
involving American Indians. See Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159,
1164-65 (6th Cir. 1980); Badone v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980); Crow

v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 977 (1983). See, e.g., Note, The First Amendment and the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act: An Approach to Protectingthe Native American Religion, 71
IowA L. REv. 869 (1986) (the Yoder test must be integrated with the policies of the
AIRFA).
192. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1603-04 n.2.
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Scalia admits-even proclaims-is to be preferred to close judicial scrutiny. Presumably, the only recourse would be to the
equal protection clause, which would require proof of uncon4
stitutional prosecutorial bias, 193 or intended adverse effects.'
Justice Scalia's response to the deficiencies of balancing is
odd, to say the least. In cases involving other aspects of the
first amendment, there have been at least two responses, when
the Court finds balancing to be inadequate. One is to resort to
a different and more categorical approach-sometimes labeled,
misleadingly, an absolutist test. This is the approach of the
better efforts to explain expressive liberty secured by the first
amendment. 195 The other, unsatisfactory response is to complete
the process of hand-wringing, and to abdicate judicial responsibility altogether. It is the latter alternative which is selected by
the Court in Smith I.
Truly, the jurisprudence of the first amendment has not always
provided generous protection for religious practices of those
who are "different." Justice Scalia knows this fact, admits it,
and proclaims it as a justification for Smith IL.1 96 Still, oppressions in the past show the need for care and sensitivity in the
present and future. Judicial failures do not justify judicial abdication, a cure that is worse than the disease.
When a court is asked to define the dimensions of human
freedom, a sensitivity to the plight of the victims of America's
past and present is a duty imposed by history, 97 not a cold and
impersonal logic. As Felix S. Cohen wrote:
It is a pity that so many Americans today think of
the Indian as a romantic or comic figure in American
history without contemporary significance. In fact, the
Indian plays much the same role in our American
society that the Jews played in Germany. Like the
193. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (proof that laws were administered
and enforced "so exclusively against a particular class ... with a mind so unequal and
oppressive" establishes "a practical denial by State of [equal] protection of the laws.").
194. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) ("where both impermissible ...
motivation and ... discriminatory impact are demonstrated," a superficially neutral
law violates equal protection).
195. See supra notes 182-83.
196. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1605-06.

197. Cf. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (title VII challenge to Alaskan cannery's alleged employment discrimination against Eskimo and Filipino workers) ("One wonders whether the majority still
believes that race discrimination-or, more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was").
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miner's canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh
air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our
treatment of Indians ... reflects the rise and fall in
our democratic faith. 198
The results of politics-all too often and all too tragicallyhave been laws that cannot be realistically viewed as "neutral."
"The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates
the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or
emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and
the Amish."'19 If truly "strict" scrutiny has never been the real
test for religious freedom-and it probably never was-an immunity for the superficially neutral decisions of the political
process is a formula for a democratic totalitarianism that can
extend its influence to all aspects of human life, if only laws
are drafted with a "chaste affection for legal formalities. "2 °°
V. Religious Privacy
Jefferson's famous metaphor of a "wall of separation between
church and state" has provoked endless controversy. 20 ' Obvi198. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Rennard Strickland, for directing me to this
passage.
199. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. A. DE TocQuEvniE, DMocasAcY iN AmRCA at 312 (J.P. Mayer & M. Lerner
eds. 1966). Tocqueville was appalled by the effects of United States policy on the culture
of the Native American in 1835, even before the depredations of later years. Tocqueville's
words were ironic, and yet he captures the delusions of legal formalities:
The Spaniards let their dogs loose on the Indians as if they were wild
beasts; they pillaged the New World like a city taken by storm, without
discrimination or mercy; but one cannot destroy everything, and frenzy
has a limit; ....
...
[T]he conduct of the United States Americans towards the natives
was inspired by the most chaste affection for legal formalities. As long as
the Indians remained in their savage state, the Americans did not interfere
in their affairs and treated them as independent peoples; they did not
allow their lands to be occupied unless they had been properly acquired
by contract; and if by chance an Indian nation cannot live on its territory,
they take them by the hand in brotherly fashion and lead them away to
die far from the land of their fathers.
The Spaniards, by unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible
shame, did not succeed in exterminating the Indian race and could not
even prevent them from sharing their rights; the United States Americans
have attained both these results with wonderful ease, quietly, legally, and
philanthropically, without spilling blood and without violating a single one
of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world. It is impossible
to destroy men with more respect for the laws of humanity.
Id. See also l id. at 368-69 (P. Bradley ed. 1945). Again, I am indebted to my colleague,
Professor Rennard Strickland, for pointing this passage out to me.
201. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a Committee
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ously, if his language is taken literally, the churches of America
are to enjoy absolute immunity. Of course, this extremity was
never intended by anyone, particularly Jefferson. Nevertheless,
Jefferson's metaphor is useful. It captures the sense that Americans wanted to preserve a zone of privacy for religion by
minimizing the government's ability to control religious doctrine,
expression, worship, and practice. The incompetence of government in matters of religious belief was to be reinforced with a
parallel principle that minimized government interference with
religious practice. If separation is a misleading label, perhaps
privacy-religious privacy-is a better term.
The famous cases of Meyer v. Nebraska2 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters"3 play a minor role in the peyote case. In
Smith II, Justice Scalia uses these cases to maintain that the
free exercise claim in Yoder was respected by the Court only
because it was reinforced with an additional liberty interest.
Both Meyer and Pierce are decisions that protect the broader,
but less explicit "liberty" that a person may not lose without
due process of law. In this regard, the cases are portents of
modem privacy doctrine. 2°
At issue in Meyer and Pierce were superficially neutral laws
of general applicability. In Meyer, a teacher was convicted for
violating a Nebraska statute2°5 because he taught a ten-year-old
boy some Biblical stories in the German language. The instruction occurred at the parochial school operated by the Zion
Evangelical Lutheran Congregation. 2°6 The Supreme Court of
Nebraska upheld the conviction. The state court held that the
statute did not conflict with the fourteenth amendment, but was
a valid exercise of the police power. ° The Supreme Court of
the United States overturned the conviction and the statute as
a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Traditions of religious freedom influenced the Court's

of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in T. JEFFEsoN, WRMNGs
(M. Petersen ed. 1984).

202. 262 U.S. 390 (1923))
203. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
204. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut birth control statute
violates right of privacy secured by fourteenth amendment).
205. 1919 Neb. Laws ch. 249, at 1019 ("No person, individually or as a teacher,
shall, in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to
any person in any language than the English language.").
206. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396.
207. Id.
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description of liberty interests secured by the due process clause:
"[Tihe liberty guaranteed by the due process clause.., denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual ... to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, [and] to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience.' '2
The Court focused on the rights of parents who sent their
children for religious training and foreign language study, despite
the wishes of Nebraska, which desired a homogeneous political
community.2 The Court conceded "[tihat the state may do
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of
its citizens, physically, mentally and morally. ' 210 Still, the Court
held, "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must
be respected." 2 1 ' The Court alluded to the writings of Plato and
the practices of ancient Sparta to describe a totalitarian impulse
212
'
"to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens.
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius their ideas touching
the relation between individual and state were wholly
different from those upon which our institutions rest;
and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature
could impose such restrictions upon the people of a
state without doing 2violence
to both letter and spirit
13
of the Constitution.
The neutrality of the challenged law was of no significance. The
Court did not merely require an exemption; it overturned the
statute. Still, the doctrine of the case is that constitutional law
must respect and foster diversity, individuality, and nonconfornity. Meyer holds that American law must cherish these
qualities, not because there will be anarchy, but because there
will be liberty. Of course, the religious inspiration of the teacher,
parents and children was not an explicit basis for the Court's
reasoning. Still, mechanical categorization of cases by topic or
21 4
label[ must not dominate analysis.
20:3. Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 400-01.
210. Id. at 401.
21t. Id.
212. Id. at 401-02.
213. Id. at 402.
214. Though Meyer and Pierceare today more frequently analyzed as privacy cases,
they can be understood as "liberty interest" cases under the fourteenth amendment.
Cf. Cnrzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 n.7 (1990).
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Meyer, and its sequel, Pierce,215 must be seen as authority for
a general liberty, with roots and inspiration in the original values
of the free exercise clause. These cases illuminate the close
intellectual link between traditions of religious freedom and an
evolving, expanding liberty. The evolving principles of individual
liberty show that the free exercise clause might be better understood as a guarantee of religious privacy. Even Judge Bork
agrees that, in this respect, the Constitution commands a "privatization of morality."
The Constitution does protect defined aspects of an
individual's privacy and it does privatize specified areas of moral behavior. The fourth amendment's protection of the privacy of the home from unreasonable
searches is an illustration of the former, as is the first
amendment's 1protection
of the free exercise of religion
26
of the latter.
Preferring the ambiguity of text to the lessons of history,
Justice Scalia does not trace the origins of the phrase "free
exercise" of religion. The omission may be a tactic of convenience. After a careful review of ambiguous and often conflicting
evidence, Professor Michael McConnell concludes that "the
modern doctrine of free exercise exemptions is more consistent
with the original understanding than is a position that leads only

to the facial neutrality of legislation.'

'217

The words of the first amendment were-and are-ambiguous.
"[T]he reported debates [of Congress], brief though they were,
cast a modicum of light on the meaning of what would become
the religion clauses of the First Amendment.1 21 1 A simple, sensible interpretation of Congress' choice of language for the
religion clauses emphasizes style, not substance.
Congress approached the subject in a somewhat hasty
and absent-minded manner. To examine the two clauses
... as a carefully worded analysis of Church-State
215. In Pierce, two corporations operating private schools obtained injunctive relief
against Oregon's superficially neutral compulsory education law because the statute
violated the fundamental rights of parents who wished to have their children attend
private schools. Pierce, like Meyer, is formally tied only to the broader "liberty" of
the due process clause, so that the cultural and intellectual liberty of parents would not
be unduly restricted by the definition of "religion."
216. R. Boax, supra note 1, at 24647 (emphasis added).
217. See, e.g., Historical Understanding, supra note 5, at 1512.
218. FnST FREEDOMS, supra note 5, at 199.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991

48

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

relations would be to overburden them. Similarly, to
see the two clauses as separate, balanced, competing
or carefully worked out prohibitions designed to meet
different eventualities would be to read into the minds
of the actors far more than was there ....
The [religion] clauses represented a double declaration of what
Americans wanted to assert about Church and State.
Congress settled on the wording of the Amendment
because it probably found the phrases the most felicitous-sounding of those proposed; but any of the other
formats would have served its substantive purpose
219

equally well.

Even if the outer boundaries of religious freedom were not
charted, the central purpose of the first amendment is more
evident. James Madison did not share the religious sentiments
of his friend, Thomas Jefferson. The deeply religious Madison
believed that a person's duty to God is "precedent both in order
of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society."
The Religion ... of every man must be left to the
conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the

right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate ....

It is the duty of every man to render to the

Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes
to be acceptable to him. "t
2:19. Id. at 216-17.
220. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in MiND op THE FOUNDBR,
suprer note 170, at 9, quoted in Historical Understanding, supra note 5, at 1453.
221. Id. Professor McConnell argues that Madison's views illustrate the fact that
constitutionally-mandated exemptions were anticipated by both the proponents and the
opponents of the free exercise clause. The movement for guarantees for free exercise
of religion were influenced by an "evangelistic movement," Historical Understanding,
suprv note 5, at 1438, which doubted that "government support is necessary or even
useful, to religion." Id. at 1442. In particular, evangelicals did not accept the view that
religious liberty-was a method of solving a primarily political problem of "religious
divisions and discord." Id. at 1445. Instead, religious enthusiasts feared government
and sought to define "free exercise ... in the first instance, by what matters God is
concerned about, according to the conscientious belief of the individual." Id. at 1446.
To be sure, "[p]roponents did attempt to minimize the practical consequences of ...
exemptions ... by stoutly declaring their fealty to almost all of the laws." Id. at 1447.
Refeiring to the writings of William Penn, the leader of the Pennsylvania Quaker
community, and John Leland, a leader of the Virginia Baptists, Professor McConnell
concludes that both anticipated that the duty to obey law would be limited-in an
indefinite way-by the paramount duty to obey the dictates of God. Id. at 1447-48.
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Thus, in direct conflict with Justice Scalia's assumption, it
appears that in some respects, at least one of the framers-the
principal sponsor of the amendment-advocated a broad free
exercise principle so that law would not always override the
individual conscience. While Americans generally agreed "with
the necessity of virtue and religion for civil society," many,
including Madison and the legislators of Virginia, "reasoned
that if religion were to remain healthy, it had to remain free
22
from the interfering hand of government." m
In this perspective, Madison's theories of religious liberty were
influenced by the evangelical understanding of religious libertyY2
Freedom for religious worship, like freedom of thought and
freedom of expression, was designed to keep the minds of men
unencumbered by government-proscribed orthodoxy. The point
here is that it was not enough for Madison and the evangelicals
to convince government to "tolerate" religionY2 In the words
of George Washington, "[it is now no more that toleration is
spoken of, as if it was by indulgence of one class of people,
that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural
rights. ' "2 The important words are "inherent" and "natural."
Rights of religious belief and practice belonged to all human
beings because such rights sprang from a duty to God "precedent
both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims
of Civil Society"; n 6 it followed that these rights could neither
be granted by government nor denied by government.
[T]he free exercise clause ... makes an important

'statement about the limited nature of governmental
authority. While the particular conception of the divine
is authoritative, the free exercise clause stands as a
222. FIRsT FREEDoMs, supra note 5, at 220.
223. Historical Understanding,supra note 5, at 1446.
224. when George Mason proposed the term "toleration" for the religious
liberty clause of the Virginia Bill of Rights, Madison objected on the
ground that the word "toleration" implies an act of legislative grace,
which in Locke's understanding it was. Madison proposed, and the Virginia
assembly adopted, the broader phrase: "the full and free exercise of
religion.
Historical Understanding, supra note 5, at 1443 (citing Hunt, James Madison and
Religious Liberty, 1 ANN. REP. Am. HisT. A. 163, 166 (1901)).
225. Id. at 1443-44 (quoting 31 G. WASHINGTON, THE WRrriNGs oF GEORGE WASHINGTON 93 n.65 (J.Fitzpatrick ed. 1939)).
226. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in MIND OF Ta FOUNDER,
supra note 170, at 9, quoted in Historical Understanding, supra note 5, at 1453.
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recognition that such divine authority may exist and,
if it exists, has a rightful claim on the allegiance of
believers who happen to be American citizens ....227
Professor McConnell concludes that the framers' anticipation of
exemptionsu from the operation of ordinary laws for religious
practice speaks to the essential attributes of liberty in American
culture.
If government admits that God (whomever that may
be) is sovereign, then it also admits that its claims on
the loyalty and obedience of the citizens is partial and
instrumental. Even the mighty democratic will of the
people is, in principle, subordinate to the commands
of God, as heard and understood in the individual
conscience. In such a nation, with such a commitment,
totalitarian tyranny is a philosophical impossibility. 229
Unfortunately, many of the practical implications of these
principles were unresolved. The free exercise principle was never
thought to establish an absolute immunity. The defenders of
free exercise rights were searching for a limiting principle to
balance individual rights against the needs of society. Madison
apparently believed that the rights of free exercise should not
be denied "unless under the color of religion the preservation
of equal liberty and the existence of the State are manifestly
endangered."2 0 Madison's arguments persuaded the Virginia
assembly not to adopt broader language proposed by George
Mason that would have allowed legislation to protect "the peace,
the happiness or safety of society."' 1 Neither version of the
proposed language was included in the final enactment. 232
Obviously, as Professor McConnell concludes, the whole argument between Madison and Mason was superfluous if all
"overt acts" could be regulated by law. Oliver Ellsworth, a
member of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and later
Chief Justice of the United States, echoed Jefferson's concern
for "overt acts against peace & good order" when he stated a
limit on religious liberty in familiar terms: "[C]ivil power has
a right, in some cases to interfere in matters of religion. It has
227. Historical Understanding, supra note 5, at 1516-17.
228. Id. at 1443.
229. Id. at 1516-17.
2.10. Id. at 1463.
231. Id.
22;2.
Id.
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a right to prohibit and punish gross immoralities and impieties
because the open practice of these is of evil example and public
detriment."2 3 Madison adhered to such views until late in life,
when he reaffirmed his conviction that the rights of religious
it does not trespass
liberty should prevail "in every case where
4
on private rights or the public peace."21
In a few specific areas ... Americans did during the
revolutionary period work out specific practical applications of their theories on Church and State. The
inhabitants of all the states decided that government
had no power to prohibit the free exercise of peaceable
religion. All states agreed with Jefferson that civil
government could interfere when "principles break out
into overt acts against peace & good order"; but
otherwise, citizens had a right to practice the religions
of their choice, even the hated Catholicism, which had
been proscribed in colonial America.2"
In short, even if the framers were not specific about what rule
should guide the decision to weigh claims of religious liberty
against the claims of society, they were specific that the claims
of society sh6uld not always prevail over the individual's conscience.
The law of religious privacy, like the broader concepts of
privacy, should be linked to a sense that what is done behind
closed doors in private religious communities is less likely to be
a matter of government concern.32 6 No one argued for absolute
immunity for religiously-inspired behavior; no one argued for
an absolute governmental power to interfere with religious worship through laws of neutral form. And yet, in the descriptions
of the framers' sense of religious freedom, references to government's need to deal with "overt acts" or "open" impieties
suggest that government's need to act is less when worship was
covert or private. The concept of privacy also embraces the
privacy of thoughts and beliefs, premised on the overriding
conviction that the relation between a person and that person's
God is a private matter, a matter beyond the competence of the
233. Connecticut Courant (Dec. 17, 1787), quoted in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 604 n.2 (1961). See also Frost FREEnom, supra note 5, at 218.
234. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, (July 10, 1822), reprinted
in MmND oF THE FouNDER, supra note 170, at 432, quoted in Historical Understanding,
supra note 5, at 1464.
235. Fms- FREEaoms, supra note 5, at 219.
236. Historical Understanding, supra note 5, at 1464-65.
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staite, and involving duties-real or imagined-that precede the
obligations to civil society23 7 The framers developed a plan for
limited government, not a totalitarian regime in which the paramount duty would be to render unto Caesar that which Caesar
demands. In a civil society with limited government, the absence
of a Caesar would allow the individual to render unto God that
which the individual believed was owed to God, unless and until
it was critically important that the individual's conscience be
subordinated to the interests of the state.238
One application of the framers' attitude is suggested by the
facts in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.23 9
There is little doubt that the framers believed that government
coudd not compel persons to express respect for secular authority, when such expression violated a person's religious convictions.m Barnette was announced during World War II, America's
first and greatest struggle against a hideous totalitarianism. Justice
Jackson, writing for the Court, spoke for limited government,
freedom of the mind, and the privacy of religious scruple. It is
this passage that illustrates the finer traditions of "a century of
our jurisprudence," and not the older, overruled and discredited
compulsory flag salute case, Gobitis,241 that Justice Scalia preferred to remember:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us. 24
Justice Scalia, no doubt, believes that nothing in the peyote case
contradicts this theme of liberty. First amendment principles of
expressive liberty explain the result in Barnette and much of
Justice Jackson's eloquent plea for intellectual diversity. The
case struck down compulsory flag salutes, because the Court
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1517 ("To [the proponents of religious liberty], the freedom to follow
religious dogma was one of this nation's foremost blessings, and the willingness of the
nation to respect the claims of a higher authority than 'those whose business it is to
make laws' was one of the surest signs of its liberality").
239. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
20. Id. at 633 n.13.
21. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
242. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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understood that "a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's
right to speak his own mind, [does not allow] public authorities
' 3
to compel [an individual] to utter what is not in his mind." u
So, it is probably true that the expansive definitions of expressive
liberty in the twentieth century solve many problems which the
framers and ratifiers of the first amendment understood as free
exercise issues. 24 And, as Justice Scalia points out, each of the
other opinions upholding free exercise claims alluded to constitutionally-protected liberty interests in addition to rights of religious autonomy. Still, none of these additional factors create
a distinction; the presence of additional liberty interests only
demonstrates that principles of religious privacy parallel-even
inspire-the newer conceptions of individual liberty and personal
privacy.
The Americans of the revolutionary and founding periods
"passed to subsequent generations the task of working out the
consequences of the principle that the state had no competence
in religious matters." 2 5 Even a judiciary that goes beyond original understanding of constitutional text to redefine the balance
of power and liberty in the modem era should be reluctant to
dismantle the core protections of an explicit liberty. If courts
are to continue the framers' search for principles of religious
liberty, the courts have no choice but to weigh competing interests and to give close scrutiny to the reasons for governmental
intrusion on private religious practice.
Moreover, the framers also understood that such issues were
matters for the courts. Justice Scalia's statement that the values
of the Bill of Rights-and the values of the first amendment,
in particular-should be left to political institutions is directly
inconsistent with evidence of original understanding that is quite
specific and pertinent. James Madison, the principal sponsor of
the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives, believed that
the real danger to religious liberty and the other important
freedoms of the individual lay in the power of majorities. 2" In
correspondence with Thomas Jefferson, Madison had expressed
doubt that "parchment barriers" would be effective, if the
243. Id. at 634.
244. See, e.g., id. at 633-35. James Madison, for one, was profoundly moved by
the spectacle of "5 or 6 well meaning men," Baptist preachers who had been jailed for
publishing their religious views. "The usually soft-spoken Madison described such

persecution as a "diabolical Hell-conceived principle ....

"

Historical Understanding,

supra note 5, at 1452-53.
245. FrsT FREaDous, supra note 5, at 221.

246. Id. at 205.
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people chose to violate a specifically declared right. 247 Virginia's
experience with the issues of religious liberty was the source of
Madison's skepticism.2 Jefferson, still in Paris as he had been
during the federal convention, replied that Madison had overlooked the special power vested in the courts if a bill of rights
were adopted. 2 9 Jefferson's analysis was an important factor in
Madison's conversion to the cause of a bill of rights, as Madison's own remarks before the House indicated:
It has been said that it is unnecessary to load the
Constitution with [a declaration of rights], because it
was not found effectual in the constitution of the
particular States. It is true, there are a few particular
States in which some of the most valuable articles have
not, at one time or other, been violated; but it does
not follow but they may have, to a certain degree, a
salutary effect against the abuse of power. If they are
incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
power in the Legislature or Executive; they will naturally be led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the
0
declaration of rights.2Y
These familiar discussions between Jefferson and Madison underscore the most persuasive interpretation of the first amendment's reason for being. If the views of Madison and Jefferson
diverged on some matters,251 on this point they agreed, and their
views are crucial evidence of the original understanding that the
values of the first amendment, including the free exercise clause,
were not to be relegated to the vagaries of the political process.a21
247. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in
MID OF To FOUNDER, supra note 170, at 206.
248. Id. See also Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789)
reprinted in MIND OF Tm FOUNDER, supra note 170, at 210, 219-20.
:29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), reprintedin
T.
-EFFERSON:
WRnnwos 943 (M. Petersen ed. 1984).
250. James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in MInD OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 170, at 210, 223-24.
251. See supra notes 66, 220-23 and accompanying text.
2152. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
("The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
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V1. Conclusion
Self-government is the rule in our society. Judicial intervention

is, and ought to be, the exception. The peyote case enforces the
rule, and narrows the exception, because of a faith that the

people's representatives will reinforce the values of the Bill of
Rights. It is a faith we dare not lose; but it is an expectation

we dare not trust. The issues of morality and religion produce
a self-righteousness not easily cabined with appeals for civic
virtue and democratic self-restraint .2 3 Zealous religious factions
represent the same sort of danger to cultural and political sta-

bility as factions defined by class status, economic self-interest,
4 Still, such factions must be guaranand political philosophy.2Y
teed the same expressive and political liberty as skeptics and
others with more secular philosophies. To restrain the deleterious
effects of these factions, the Constitution provides not only the
political safeguards of the original, unamended document, but
also the substantive limits of the Bill of Rights.
The Constitution was designed to prevent the accumulation
of excessive power.2 5 This overriding objective requires that the
Court not only protect specific liberties and privacies, but a
general liberty from the innovative assaults of ambitious political

officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."); Smith
1I,110 S.Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Mhe First Amendment was enacted
precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by the
majority and may be viewed with hostility").
253. Compare, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
("If the impulse and opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither
moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found
to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in
proportion to the number combined together.") with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If you have no doubt of your premises or your
power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes
in law and sweep away all opposition").
254. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58-59 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison
states:
The latent causes of faction are ...

sown in the nature of man; and we

see them every where brought into different degrees of activity.... A
zeal for different opinions concerning religion [isone cause that has]
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than
to cooperate....

So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into

mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the
most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their
most unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts.
255. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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leaders. There is no warrant in logic, history, tradition, precedent, or original understanding for surrendering or compromising this most fundamental principle. It is trite, but true that the
Constitution seeks to strike a balance: The majority's liberty to
govern must not be extinguished, but the minority's liberty to
live, to think, to speak, and to worship must enjoy a respect6
that is best promoted with a qualified constitutional immunity.25
Clo:se and careful judicial scrutiny is an attempt to preserve a
role in society for individual religious conscience. It is a balancing test designed to preserve and protect an ideal of liberty.
The compelling interest test reflects the first amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible
in a. pluralistic society. For the Court to deem this command a
"luxury" is to disparage "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of
7
Rights.,,21
In the aftermath of the peyote case, unless the "better angels
of our nature" z 8 receive quick, effective lessons in the tactics
of politics or in the skills of instilling civic virtue-a self-restraint
and a respect for the rights of others-the tragic echoes of past
American repressions will resonate; they will again assume form
and substance as law beyond the Court's resolve to check and
balance.

256. THE FmmAIS

No. 10, at 58 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("It could

not te a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it
nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential
to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.").
257. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
258. First Inaugural Address by Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in

ABnP.AA
1989).

LncoLN: SPEacHns AND WRrNos 1859-1865, at 224 (D. Fehrenbacher ed.
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